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ABSTRACT 
The central theme of this dissertation is the contribution that the theory of human ontology 
developed by the philosopher John SearIe can make to economics. SearIe's account of the 
cognitive functioning associated with rational behaviour provides a framework within which 
to analyse the role of conscious and non-conscious factors in rational behaviour; the nature 
and functioning of discursive and tacit knowledge; and the distinction between intentional 
and non-intentional states. Using this framework, each of the three essays which make up the 
core of this dissertation examines aspects of the conception of economic agency associated 
with a different field in economics; critical realism, behavioural finance and mainstream 
microeconomics. 
The first essay, which looks at the critical realist conception of the human actor in 
Tony Lawson ' s Economics and Reality, argues that Lawson leaves undeveloped the notion 
of tacit knowledge, failing to explain important differences between knowledge that 
functions by virtue of conscious reflection and that which functions tacitly. From a SearIean 
perspective the key omission is argued to be the technical notion of intentionality, upon 
which SearIe develops an account of tacit knowledge. I show how this notion of 
intentionality evades my criticism of Lawson. 
The seconc! essay examines the conception of agency associated with behavioural 
finance from the perspective of the human ontology proposed by Searle. The principle theme 
of the essay is that each of the psychological traits that behavioural finance draws on, 
namely prospect theory, judgmental heUlistics and mental accounting, involves the interplay 
of both conscious and non-conscious factors. Consequently the agent of behavioural finance 
is a construction that is readily intelligible in SearIean terms. I argue that this finding leads to 
a conception of the rationality of the agent encountered in the behavioural finance literature 
that is quite different from the way in which it is commonly presented. 
The mainstream microeconomic conception of the human actor is the focus of the 
final essay, in which it is argued that the treatment of human knowledge on this approach 
neglects a number of important factors in economic behaviour. The first half of the essay 
uses a simple Cournot duopoly game under conditions of complete and incomplete 
information 111 order to highlight the usual assumptions about actors ' knowledge in 
mainstream models. On the basis of these findings the second half of the essay then 
considers three aspects of human agency that these models neglect: non-probabilistic forms 
of unceltainty and ignorance, the subjectivity of knowledge and the role of tacit knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most exciting developments in contemporary economics has been the move 
toward~ explicit ontological theorising, a move most clearly seen in the projects of critical 
realism (Archer at al. 1998; Fleetwood 1999; Lawson 1997, 2003) and economic 
ontology (Maki 2001), as well as many heterodox traditions in economics l . In this 
dissertation I take the call to ontology seriously by adopting an explicitly ontological 
perspective to examining important aspects of the conceptions of human economic 
agency found in three prominent projects in economics: clitical realism, behavioural 
finance and mainstream microeconomics. In particular my focus is on the mental 
ontology associated with the decision-making processes of agents in each of the projects 
under consideration, drawing on the philosopher of mind John Searle as a source of 
insight. 
In order to outline my own project it will prove useful at the outset to distinguish 
between two different aspects of the so-called 'ontological turn' in economks. The first 
of these is concern~d primarily with economic methodology, and employs ontological 
reasoning in order to ground arguments about the likely usefulness of particular practices 
or methods in economics. ImpOltant though it is, this aspect of the ontological turn, most 
closely associated~ with the project of critical realism in economics, is not the sort of 
project that I pursue in this dissertation. Rather, each of my essays is an example of a 
second aspect of the ontological turn, which involves the use of ontological arguments as 
an aid to the critical assessment and development of more substantive economic theories. 
The form that such arguments take is captured in the notion of 'ontological elaboration', 
the goal of which is to uncover the presuppositions about social being that economic 
theolies (often implicitly) rely upon, and to compare these with the actual nature of social 
being. 
A good deal has already been achieved under the heading of ontological 
elaboration. Contributors have examined the ontological presuppositions of various 
theoretical approaches to economics and attempted to elaborate many of the forms of 
social structure and related categories that are otherwise taken for granted in modem 
1 Including Austrian, Evolutionary, Feminist, Institutionalist, Marxist and Post-Keynesian writers. 
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economics2• One aspect of social reality that has so far been relatively under theorised 
however is the human agent. With the exception of Mat·gat"et Archer's work on the 
concepts of culture and identity (Archer 1995, 1996, 2000), and the more recent 
contributions of John Davis on collective intentionality (Davis 2002), Ralph Pfouts on the 
ontology of the consumer (Pfouts 2002) and Geoff Hodgson on the relationship between 
human agency and social structure (Hodgson 2002, 2003), many aspects of human 
ontology have still to be properly examined. In this dissertation I concentrate on one such 
area: the various mental processes involved in human economic decision-making. 
The importance to economics of adequately conceptualising this aspect of human 
agency is evident from the fact that all economic phenomena depend in part on the 
actions, thoughts and conceptions of individual human actors. Consequently the way in 
which actors are portrayed - what they are presumed to know, what motivates them to act 
and how they decide between the various courses of action open to them - is a key 
component of most economic explanations. In the three essays that make up my 
dissertation I examine aspects of the mental ontology associated with the conceptions of 
human agency and decision-making found in three important projects in economics: 
critical realism, behavioural finance and mainstream microeconomics. My goal in each 
paper is first to elaborate the mental ontology associated with the particular conception 
under considerati~n and to then offer a critical assessment of that conception based on the 
ontology so elaborated. 
In evaluating the mental ontology of each conception I draw extensively on 
findings from the philosophy of mind. Since philosophy of mind is concerned in part with 
studying the contents and characteristics of the human mind, that is, with understanding 
the nature of mental states, of conscious and non-conscious processes, of tacit and 
discursive knowledge, of rational behaviour, and so on, this literature provides just the 
sort of explicit ontological account of the mind that my project requires. For reasons that I 
discuss in section II below, I draw particularly on John Searle's account of the ontology 
of the human mind. 
2 Including evolutionary theory (Hodgson 1999a), modern macroeconomics (Hoover 2001) and 
microeconomics (Rosenberg 2001), the firm and region (c. Lawson 1999), metaphor (Lewis 1996), 
institutions (Hodgson 2003), the relationship between social structure and human agency (Hodgson 2002), 
money (Ingham 1996) , markets (O'Neill 2001), transactions (Pratten 1997). See Lawson (2003) chapter 2, 
and pages 302 and 305, for many more examples of this sort of work. 
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I shall structure my introductory remarks as follows. First of all I provide a blief 
overview of each of the three papers included in the dissertation and reflect on the sort of 
insights that a project of this kind can generate. Next I defend my decision to concentrate 
exclusiyely on John Searle's philosophy of mind in each essay. While a broader project, 
taking in competing conceptions of human agency may well prove beneficial to 
economics, I argue that there are good reasons for beginning with Searle's work. Finally I 
examine how the project that I pursue here fits into histolical and contemporary 
developments within economics. The feature that comes through most clearly here is the 
tendency for economists , past and present, to have neglected issues of philosophy of 
mind, in particular the nature of human mental ontology. 
I THREE ESSAYS ON RATIONALITY, INTENTIONALITY AND ECONOMIC 
AGENCY 
I begin, then, by reviewing each of the essays that make up this dissertation, pattly as a 
means of introducing my work but also as a way of indicating the manner in which an 
ontological project of the sort pursued here can yield useful insights. In the first essay, 
'Some problems ~ith the conception of the human subject in critical realism', I examine 
the portrayal of the human actor in Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality (Lawson 
1997). Lawson is a prominent contributor to critical realism, a methodologically oriented 
project concemed with establishing the possibilities for economics (and social science in 
general) by way of examining the nature of social reality. To this end Lawson develops a 
theory of social ontology, one element of which, his account of the human actor, provides 
the subject matter of this essai. 
According to the social ontology Lawson develops in Economics and Reality, 
social reality is a structured, emergent and inherently dynamic realm consisting in social 
structures (such as rules, relations and positions) and human practices. While (by 
definition) social reality depends, in part, on human agency, Lawson rejects both 
3 Other contributors to critical realism defend a similar conception of social reality to Lawson (especially 
Bhaskar 1978, 1979). I focus on Lawson's work in this essay because he provides the clearest and most 
developed account of the human subject and also because his is the work that has had most impact on 
economics. 
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voluntarist and determinist accounts of social reality in favour of a transformational 
model that recognises social structure as both a condition and consequence of human 
action, and so social structure and human social practices as ontologically distinct 
categodes. 
Turning to the portrayal of the human agent within the transformational model, 
one of the most important aspects of social reality that Lawson must explain is how social 
rules play a causal role in human behaviour. Here the observation that many social 
practices are pelformed habitually, with rules being adhered to without being consciously 
followed, leads Lawson to argue that many social rules are known to us only tacitly. Yet 
the fact that in certain circumstances social rules are consciously followed requires 
Lawson to distinguish between discursive and tacit knowledge of rules, where the former 
requires conscious attention in order for the rules to influence behaviour, while tacit 
knowledge does not. 
It is this aspect of Lawson' s account of the human subject that is addressed by the 
first essay. In particular I argue that Lawson leaves the crucial notion of tacit knowledge 
under-developed, failing to adequately explain the ontological difference between 
knowledge that functions by virtue of being consciously thought about, and that which 
functions tacitly. Having outlined the nature of the problem in the first half of the essay, I 
then propose th'!.t John Searle's account of human ontology provides a possible 
resolution . The remainder of the essay provides an overview of Searle's conception of the 
human mind, showing how from the distinction between intentional and non-intentional 
states, Searle provides an account of the functioning of both consciously reflected-upon 
knowledge and tacitly functioning, 'Background', knowledge which evades my original 
criticism of Lawson . 
The second essay, 'The human agent in behavioural finance: a Searlean 
perspective', puts forward a Searlean interpretation of the conception of human agency 
found in behavioural finance . The field of behavioural finance has developed rapidly over 
the last twenty years , based on introducing the findings of experimental psychology into 
economics in order to explain aspects of financial market behaviour. The resulting 
conception of agency that has emerged emphasises three types of psychological traits: 
prospect theory, judgmental heuristics and mental accounting. My main contention in this 
essay is that in certain key respects the agent of behavioural finance is a recognisably 
Searlean human agent. 
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The argument here centres on one of the dominant themes of Searlean human 
ontology, that the mental input into rational behaviour consists of both conscious, 
reflected upon, reasons for action, as well as non-conscious, predispositions and 
knowledge that function without conscious reflection. After bliefly summarising this 
aspect of Searle's theory at the beginning of the essay, I then examine the three sets of 
traits emphasised in behavioural finance. Although the question of how these traits 
actually function is rarely addressed by the literature, all three appear to involve the 
interplay of both conscious and non-conscious factors. Viewed in this light, a Searlean 
ontology employing the distinction between intentional and non-intentional states, 
together with the notion of intentional and Background causation, is a natural framework 
within which to conceive of the kind of agent encountered in the behavioural finance 
literature. 
This insight has important implications for the subject of behavioural finance. An 
interesting feature of this literature is a lack of consensus regarding how the human actor 
should be conceptualised. One position to take here is simply to regard the agent of 
behavioural finance as irrational. This view, common both inside and outside of 
behavioural finance, is well expressed by Shleifer, who regards behavioural finance as the 
placing of 'the biased, the stupid, and the confused into competitive financial markets' 
(Shleifer 2000: 24). The reasoning behind such judgements is rarely fully articulated, but 
mostly reflects the fact that the behavioural finance conception often involves behaviour 
that is in conflict with the axioms of the expected utility model of mainstream economics. 
I suggest a different interpretation of the agent in behavioural finance. From a 
Searlean perspective the reduction of rational behaviour to expected utility maximisation 
is mistaken4 • While the expected utility model emphasises the role of conscious beliefs 
and preferences, rational human behaviour according to Searle inevitably involves non-
conscious as well as conscious factors. Many of these non-conscious factors, such as our 
tacit knowledge of simple heuristics, aid rather than hinder rational behaviour. The traits 
of the kind of agent that emerges in the behavioural finance literature therefore need not 
4 Searle himself expresses dissatisfaction with decision theoretic models of rationality in a number of places 
(e.g., 1995: 138-139; 2001: 30-31), highlighting in particular the implausibility of assuming that individuals 
will always be prepared to trade-off risk and return, and the neglect in these models for the role that 
deliberation plays in determining individual's preferences. 
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simply reflect the stupidity or confusion of Shleifer's interpretation; rather they may be 
characteristic of human rationality. 
The significance of this difference, between VIeWIng a model of agency as 
descIib5ng vaIious inationalities and viewing it as captuIing various common traits of 
rational behaviour, has implications for the applicability and therefore importance of 
behavioural finance. If on the one hand these traits merely constitute mistakes and 
anomalies, then traditional finance based on the expected utility maximising individual 
has little to won'y about. After all, such iITational individuals will either learn from their 
mistakes and stop making them, or be exploited financially by other, more rational actors 
(Russell 1997)5. But if on the other hand the traits in question are characteristic of rational 
human behaviour, inevitable features of actors trying to do the best for themselves, then 
such traits are a necessary part of studying human behaviour in financial markets. 
The final essay, ' Information, Knowledge and Agency' , examines some of the 
limitations of the mainstream microeconomic approach to the issues of · knowledge, 
ignorance and uncertainty. The essay begins with a look at the nature and extent of the 
knowledge that agents are assumed to have in mainstream models. This is achieved by 
way of a careful examination of a representative mainstream model, in this case a simple 
one-shot Cournot duopoly game under conditions of both complete and incomplete 
information . I shQ.w that even in models designed explicitly to highlight the effects of 
impeIfections and asymmetries in actors' knowledge, the degree to which the 
complexities of human knowledge are reflected in these models is severely limited. In the 
second half of the essay I consider in some detail three aspects of human agency that are 
neglected by the mainstream approach: non-probabilistic forms of uncertainty and 
ignorance, the subjectivity of knowledge, and tacit knowledge. 
The main finding of the essay is that the much vaunted information theoretic 
revolution in microeconomics (Stiglitz 1987, 1992, 1994, 2000) represents only a first 
step towards incorporating the effects of factors such as uncertainty, ignorance and 
subjectivity into economics. For instance, by virtue of the commitment to expected utility 
models of decision-making, the actors within mainstream microeconomic models 
5 Although there are limits to sllch arbitrage arguments ; for instance it can pay for 'rational' actors to act in 
the same way as ' irrational ' actors rather than attempt to exploit them (Haltiwanger and Waldman 1985; 
Russell and Thaler 1985) and the supply of arbitrage is anyway likely to be limited (De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldman 1990) . 
7 
inevitably suffer only certain forms of uncertainty. There is no scope in these models for 
actors to be affected by ignorance of the full set of possible eventualities that might result 
from their actions (or indeed the options open to them), or to alter their behaviour as a 
result Of being unable to state precise probabilities. Consequently categories such as 
surprise and novelty, and forms of behaviour such as convention and routine, remain 
outside the scope of mainstream economics. 
Elements of John Searle ' s human ontology provide the basis for my discussion of 
the two remaining areas of neglect highlighted in the essay, the subjectivity of knowledge 
and the role of tacit knowledge in human behaviour. Other than asymmetties in what 
actors are presumed to know, mainstream models make no allowance for the fact that 
much of what human beings come to know of their situation is subjective, depending on 
their existing situation, knowledge, interests, experiences and expectations. One cause of 
this subjectivity is what Searle terms the aspectual nature of conscious experience, 
according to which we unconsciously impose structure on, and interpret, all of our 
conscious experiences. The final issue dealt with in the essay, the importance of tacit 
knowledge in human behaviour, again draws on Searle, this time by considering the 
expected utility model to be an idealised form of Searle's model of intentional causation 
in which the role attributed to tacit, Background, factors is suppressed. 
Taken tog~ther, these three essays begin to indicate the range of insights that 
follow from the explicit analysis of human mental ontology, in this instance drawing on 
the work of John Searle. In the first essay my subject matter, the conception of the human 
agent in critical realism, already involves an explicit account of the agent's cognitive 
functioning. Yet from a Searlean perspective this account is argued to be inadequate. In 
contrast, while sophisticated in terms of its psychology, the behavioural finance literature 
has little to say about the mental ontology associated with its conception of the human 
agent. This time a Searlean perspective provides an ontological framework within which 
to make sense of the various traits of this conception of agency, leading to the possibility 
that the existing understanding of behavioural finance as dealing with the effects of 
in'ationalities and stupidity in financial markets is mistaken . The third and final essay 
attempts to draw out the implicit ontology associated with the mainstream microeconomic 
conception of human agency. Once this is done, the limitations of conceiving of agency in 
these terms becomes clear, since factors such as the subjectivity of knowledge and 
uncertainty cannot be adequately treated. 
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11 JOHN SEARLE'S THEORY OF HUMAN ONTOLOGY 
Having outlined the nature of the project pursued in this dissertation and the sort of 
results .that such a project can yield, I now want to explain my decision to concentrate 
exclusively on the account of human ontology developed by John Searle6• In part this 
decision undoubtedly reflects my own interests and background at the time I began 
wIiting the dissertation. In patticular, to someone with existing interests in critical 
realism, Searle's work on social and human ontology not only represents an important 
competing perspective, but also one that is much more detailed than critical realism in 
certain respects. Most obviously, having written extensively on the philosophy of mind, 
Searle's account of human ontology is far more developed than that typically found in 
critical realist accounts. 
A second reason for focusing on Searle's work in these essays is that in my 
opinion Searle is one of the most impOltant writers within the field of philosophy of mind 
for economists to get to grips with. The reason for this is that Searle takes seIiously 
notions that economists, albeit often only implicitly, have come to rely on. As I argue in 
my second and third essays, the implicit ontology associated with the most prominent 
conceptions of the human agent in economics is one of conscious intentional states such 
as beliefs and deslres7 in association with unconscious, Background dispositions, in the 
case of behavioural finance. Given this, Searle's conception of the mind is particularly 
significant to economics for the simple reason that according to Searle (see especially 
Searle 1994a, 1997, 2002), conscious mental phenomena such as pains, feelings, visual 
experiences, beliefs, intentions, emotions and the like, exist and make a difference to 
(among other things) human behaviour. To put the point bluntly here, Searle's account of 
the mind is important to economics because it emphasises the same ontological categories 
that economists' theories of human behaviour rely upon. 
Expressed in this way, it might appear that the position Searle defends ought not 
to be particularly controversial within the philosophy of mind, yet wliters from a vatiety 
6 Beyond his work in philosophy of mind , Searle has written extensively on subjects including philosophy 
of language, the nature of social reality, the nature of science and causality. I will have relatively little to 
say about Searle ' s contributions to philosophy in these areas, but see Fotion (2000) and Hirstein (2001) for 
two very useful recent accounts . 
7 Although as I note in section III below, some writers deny even an implicit connection between rational 
choice models of decision-making and human mental ontology. 
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of different positions take issue with it. A brief survey confers some idea of what is at 
stake in these debates. Against Searle's view, logical behaviourists (Hempel 1949; Ryle 
1949) and identity theorists (Lewis 1966; Place 1956; Smart 1959, 1988) deny the 
importance (and in the limit even the existence) of consciousness by reducing mental 
states to being nothing more than behaviour and states of the brain respectively. Similarly 
functionalists (Lycan 1987; Van Gulick 1995) replace mental terms with certain relations 
between causes and effects. According to the strong artificial intelligence doctrine 
(Chomsky 1986; Fodor 1975; MaIT 1982; Newell 1982), the mind is to the brain as a 
computer program is to the computer hardware in which it is instantiated. Consequently 
what matters is not the various forms of consciousness that the mind might exhibit, but 
rather understanding the workings of the mind as a computer program. A final group of 
writers that downplay or deny the existence of consciousness are the eliminative 
materialists (Patlicia Churchland 1981, 1986, 1987; Stich 1983) who, informed by 
modern neuroscience, seek to reduce mental states and consciousness to the processes in 
the brain that cause them. 
What is common to each of these doctlines is a neglect of a theory of conscious 
mental phenomena. For these authors, an understanding of the workings of the mind does 
not require entities such as beliefs and desires 8 • Searle thinks differently. According to his 
'biological naturalist' conception, mental phenomena are dependent upon lower-level, 
physical processes in the brain . But this causal dependence of the mind on physical 
processes in the brain does not imply an ontological reduction 9 • Rather, consciousness, 
conscious states, thought processes and the like are emergent, higher-level, features of the 
brain that have causal powers of their own. Consequently rather than downplaying their 
role in understanding the mind, Searle takes seriously the idea of uncovering the 
characteristics of the conscious mind and demonstrating how consciousness is to be 
8 Of course there is yet another group of writers, the dualists, who share Searle's view that mental 
phenomena are real but then reject the idea that they have physical causes. Substantival dualists, writing in 
the spirit of Descartes and the Christian tradition , argue that the mind and body are fundamentally different 
types of substance. Searle gives short shrift to this version of dualism, arguing that it is inconsistent with 
modern scientific knowledge. Property dualists (Nagel 1974, 1986; McGinn 1991, 1999) meanwhile hold 
that mental and physical properties exclude one another by definition, so that it is an oxymoron to talk of 
mental phenomena as also being physical phenomena. 
9 See Searle (1994a, chapter 5) for a full account of the notion of ontological reduction. 
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integrated into a theory of human action lO • Consequently a Searlean-type conception of 
the mind is the natural starting-point for a project of the sort I pursue in this dissertation. 
Although perhaps the most well known contemporary philosopher to advance a 
view of the mind as emergent but in-educible to physical processes in the brain, Searle is 
certainly not alone in doing SOil . This is important, since Searle's approach and many of 
the details of his account have generated a substantial clitical literature l 2 that, it could be 
argued, cast doubt on the arguments I make in the essays that follow. Yet while 
acknowledging that debates in philosophy of mind are far from settled and that many 
aspects of Searle's account are contested, I rely not on the fine details of Searle's account, 
at which many of these criticisms are directed, but instead on the broader conception of 
the mind that Searle's account is one particularly clear illustration of. 
One final comment on the Searlean nature of my project. In choosing to focus 
exclusively on John Searle's account of human mental ontology, I do not mean to imply 
that there is little value in competing developments in contemporary philosophy of mind 
for economics. An example which competes with Searle's 'belief-first' conception of 
action is the pragmatist Hans Joas' (1993, 1996) account of human action as 'creative 
action' . Gi ven the recent re-emergence of pragmatism on the philosophical landscape, 
Joas is a particularly pertinent example of a potentially important source for economists. 
~ 
Now of course there is at least one connection between pragmatist philosophy and 
economics that is already well established, that is the link between institutionalist writers 
such as Ayres, Veblen, Commons and Mitchell, and the classical pragmatism of Pierce, 
ID For instance, and as Searle himself observes (1994: 250), despite often putting the word 'consciousness ' 
in the titles of their books , many writers on mind proceed to give little or no account of the nature of 
consciousness. In contrast, providing an account of subjective, qualitative, first-person conscious mental 
states is central to Searle 's attempt to understand the mind and its functioning (see especially Searle 1994, 
2002). 
11 I would nevertheless suggest that Searle is the most concerned with developing an explicit account of the 
characteristics of the conscious mind and their role in the functioning of the mind in behaviour. Among 
philosophers, Bindra (1976) , Bhaskar (1978, 1979), Ardila and Bunge (1987), Bunge (1980), Davidson 
(1980) and Hebb (1949) also see the mind as a set of emergent brain functions. Notably, Searle' s non-
eliminative, materiali st, view of consciousness also finds support within contemporary neuroscience (e.g. 
Crick 1994; Edelman 1989, 1992). 
12 The very tip of the iceberg here being the collections edited by Dietrich (1994), Lepore and van Gulick 
(1991) Preston and Bishop (2002) and the recent special issues of Revue lllternatiollale de Philosophie 
(June 2001 ) and The American Journal of Econolllics and Sociology (January 2003). 
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James and Dewey J3 . I focus here instead on the more recent work of Joas and the 
important contrast between his conception of action and that of Searle. 
For Joas, both the philosophy of action (including Searle) and the social sciences 
have neglected what he terms the 'creative' character of human action. By conceiving of 
cognition as independent of action , with actions following after a separate act of cognition 
concerning our situation, possibilities and wants, Joas argues that belief-first models of 
action encourage the view that our natural state is one of lethargy. Instead, Joas 
emphasises the idea that our natural state is really one of continuous action, with actors 
continually having to confront problems and act whether they want to or not. 
Accordingly, rather than preceding action, cognition is better conceived of as itself being 
a phase of action by which action is directed and redirected in its situational contexts. 
Without the creative dimension of action taken into account, Joas argues that a 
wealth of notions involved in the concept of action, such as intention, norm, identity, role, 
institution, routine etc., cannot be defined consistently and in a way that does justice to 
what they are intended to express . He notes, for instance, that the role of situation in 
action immediately changes from merely being a constraint on action to being partly 
constitutive of action, shaping our goals and motives for actingl4. Similarly our 
understanding of the notion of goal setting changes . Rather than taking place prior to 
actual action , goal setting is that part of action where the aspirations embodied in the 
body's capabilities , habits and dispositions are reflected upon and thematised. Now since 
the Searlean conception of action largely ignores the inter-relatedness of action and 
cognition, in general seeing cognition as proceeding action, these sort of insights are 
unlikely to be introduced into economics by a project that focuses exclusively on Searle. 
But this observation merely confirms the point I wish to emphasise, which is that there 
are undoubtedly more insights to introduce into economics from philosophy of mind than 
those that emerge in the essays in this dissertation . 
13 On which see Hands (2001) , Hodgson (1998) and Hodgson et at. (1994). 
14 See Hodgson (2003) for a closely related argument. 
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III ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 
To this point I have indicated why I believe that economists can gain by paying attention 
to issues of human mental ontology, and secondly, why it is that John Searle is a 
particularly significant writer in this regard within philosophy of mind. My remaining 
comments in this introduction are directed at situating my dissertation within historical 
and contemporary developments in economics. Broadly, there are three aspects to this 
that I wish to consider. The first is the tendency for issues of human mental ontology to 
be neglected within neoclassical economics, where the concept of the utility maximising 
rational agent dominates discussion of agency, action and decision-making. The second is 
the work of a number of important heterodox writers on human agency, examining the 
extent to which mental ontology features explicitly in their work. The third is the isolated 
set of instances of economists who have brought wider issues of philosophy of mind into 
the discipline, and in particular John Davis' work on collective intentionality and 
Alexander Rosenberg's critique of economists' attachment to folk psychology. 
Human Ontology in Neoclassical Economics 
As the essays that make up this dissertation demonstrate, an explicit reflection on human 
mental ontology has significant implications for how we conceive of human action and 
decision-making, raising vital questions concerning what individuals know, how they 
acquire this knowledge, how they make decisions, what motivates their actions, and so 
on. That neoclassicaJl5 economics has neglected, and continues to neglect these sorts of 
questions, and in so doing fails to address the underlying ontological issues, is hardly a 
new observation. After all, it provides a starting-point for many heterodox writers, some 
of whom I discuss later l6 . First of all though I want to be clear about precisely what is the 
problem in this regard with the neoclassical approach to the human agent. To do this, let 
me begin by identifying my target. The defining characteristic of the neoclassical model 
15 By neoclassical economics I mean the dominant, ' textbook' , approach to economics. This approach can 
usefully be characterised in terms of it's 'core ' assumptions, namely, that individuals are utility maxi misers 
with stable preferences; that analysis focuses on equilibrium states; and that chronic information problems 
and uncertainty do not exist. 
16 Relatedly, see Lewin (1996) for a historical perspective on economist's antipathy towards psychology 
and the psychological foundations of rational choice theory. 
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of economic decision-making, and consequently its conception of the human agent, is the 
idea firstly, that individuals act rationally, and secondly, that rational behaviour can be 
represented as action that maximises some single-valued utility (or expected utility) 
function. 
Now what interests me here about this conception of the human agent is the 
mental ontology associated with such 'rational choice' models. According to the standard 
interpretation I ? of these models, the utility function is viewed as representing an 
individual's subjective, introspective, evaluation of the objects of choice, with utility 
maximisation equivalent to the individual selecting the most prefened available 
alternative IS. If such an interpretation is accepted, then rational choice models evidently 
make certain commitments in terms of human mental ontology. In particular, individuals 
must be assumed to possess well-behaved subjective preferences 19, to know the set of 
feasible actions and the consequences of these actions, and be able to compute their 
optimal choice. Now the implausibility of these assumptions is widely recognised and 
related themes, regarding the lack of information and knowledge, and the limited 
computational power of the typical human being, recur throughout this dissertation. 
However what I want to emphasise at this point is that these ontological commitments are 
also highly limited in the sense that a great deal is left unexplained. For instance, the 
content of an agent's preferences at the level of mental states, the form taken by an 
agent's knowledge of his or her environment, the manner in which preferences and 
knowledge function causally, and so on, are not explicitly addressed. Consequently many 
aspects of rational choice are unclear; whether, for instance, 'preferences' include both 
conscious and unconscious motives, or alternatively whether rational choice models only 
represent the influence of conscious, premeditated, calculation on actions. 
In practice, many neoclassical economists seem content to put such questions to 
one side, prefelTing instead to get on with using the utility maximisation representation, 
rather than questioning quite what it is to which such a methodology commits them. Yet 
17 By 'standard' interpretation I mean that which ' is most common in modern neoclassical thought. 
Significantly, what I argue here to be the standard interpretation is also the typical presentation given in 
undergraduate and postgraduate microeconomic textbooks, for instance see Gravelle and Rees (1992), Mas-
Colell , Whinston and Green (1995) , Varian (1992, 2002). 
18 See Robbins (1937) and Hicks (1946). 
19 With preferences having to be assumed to conform to certain ' axioms of rational choice' in order to 
ensure the existence of the utility function representation. 
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there is also an important literature that has sought to overcome these issues by detaching 
rational choice models from any such ontological questions20. Two alternative 
interpretations of rational choice are particularly prominent here. The first, based on 
Samuelson's (1938) notion of revealed preference, argues that 'preferences' are in fact 
revealed in the observable choices that individuals make. Consequently rational choice 
models need make no commitments at all in terms of human ontology (to mental states, 
introspection, rational calculation and the like), but rather can sustain a theory of choice 
based entirely on consistent behaviour (rather than consistent preferences?l. A second 
interpretation is based on the evolutionary arguments put forward by Alchian (1950) and 
Friedman (1953). Here the idea is that utility maximisation contIibutes to an individual's 
evolutionary 'fitness' and that over time, a process of ' natural selection' promotes utility 
maximising behaviour within a population. On this interpretation questions of how 
individuals actually maximise utility are redundant, since however it is achieved, such 
individuals come to dominate. 
While each of these alternative interpretations of rational choice models is highly 
problematic in its own right22, the crucial point from my perspective is that on all of these 
accounts human mental ontology is neglected. Consequently whatever their implicit 
understanding of the nature of rational choice and the rationale for conceiving of the 
human agent in t~rms of utility maximisation , the work of neoclassical economists is 
characterised by a lack of concern for the nature of the human mind and the implications 
of this for human decision-making and action. Interestingly this neglect continues in the 
vast contemporary literature on decision-making23 , much of it in a neoclassical vein, 
which purports to develop more realistic models of utility maximisation. 
20 Indeed as Blaug and others have noted , the development of modern consumer theory from 'the 
introspective cardinalism of Jevons , Menger, Walras, and MaI'shall , to the introspective ordinalism of 
Slutsky, Alien , and Hicks, to the behaviourist ordinalism of Samuelson, to the behaviourist cardinalism of 
von-Neumann and Morgenstern' (Blaug 1992: 139-140) , can be understood in terms of the desire to detach 
utility theory from unobservable notions such as individual introspection (and mental ontology in general) . 
21 See for instance Little (1949). 
22 See in particular chapter 4 of Hodgson (1988) for a detai led discussion of the problems, as well as 
footnote 2 of my second essay. Significantly, these weaknesses lead Hodgson to argue that in the end, 
rational choice models do rely on an implicit (and incomplete) ontology of introspection, mental states and 
so on. 
23 See for instance Arrow et al (1996) and Camerer (1995) for recent surveys of this literature. If writers 
associated with critical realism and the ontological turn in economics are correct, then this continued 
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Human Ontology in Heterodox Economic Thought 
Away from neoclassical , rational choice based, conceptions of human agency, the degree 
to which the various heterodox traditions in economics address issues of human ontology 
explicitly is mixed. In this section I intend bliefly to illustrate this point by examining 
aspects of the work of a number of important heterodox writers and traditions. My aim in 
doing this is not to provide a complete survey of the treatment of human mental ontology 
in heterodox economic thought; such a task exceeds the scope of these comments. Rather 
my more modest goal is to highlight a number of the most important themes in this area 
and in so doing, continue to set out the contex~ within which my disseltation emerges24 • 
I want to begin these comments by considering the behavioural economics 
tradition, precipitated by the work of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality and the 
'administrative man' conception of the economic agent and continued in the work of 
contemporary writers such as George Loewenstein, Daniel Kahneman, Matthew Rabin, 
Robelt Shiller, Amos Tversky and Richard Thaler25 • In terms of its present prominence, 
behavioural economics is perhaps the most significant of the heterodox traditions for me 
to address in these comments. Furthermore, since the defining feature of behavioural 
economics is a psychologically informed, descriptive account of human decision-making, 
one might expect issues of mental ontology to have been a central concern for 
behavioural writers--: Yet one of the key themes of my second essay is that this has not 
been the case. Just as neoclassical accounts of decision-making leave unclear the mental 
ontology .associated with utility maximisation, so too contemporary behavioural accounts 
leave the mental ontology underlying such notions as hemistics, mental accounting and 
loss aversion unexplained. As a result, while modem behavioural accounts of decision-
neglect of ontological considerations is closely related to the commitment of many economists to 
mathematical modelling. Certainly the course taken by the literature on dec ision-making would appear to 
support such an argument , where the emphasis is on generating ever more sophisticated formal models of 
utility maximisation rather than reflecting on the underlying mental ontology that these models represent. 
See, for instance, rank dependant utility theory (Diecidue and Wakker 2001; Quiggin 1982, 1993), 
configural weight models (Birnbaum, Patton and Lott 1999) , stochastic difference models (Gonzalez-
Vallejo 2002), multialternative decision field theory (Roe, Busemeyer, Townsend 2001), the componential-
context model (Tversky and Simonson 1993) and range frequency theory (Parducci , 1965, 1974). 
24 See Rizzello (1997) for a closel y related project. 
25 For instance, see Benartzi and Thaler (2001) ; Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002); Gilovich, 
Griffin and Kahneman (2002); Lamont and Thaler (2003); Loewenstein (2001); O 'Donoghue and Rabin 
(2000); Rabin (2002a, 2002b); Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999); Shiller (2003) and Thaler (2000); 
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making are more realistic in certain respects than the traditional rational choice models of 
neoclassical economics, they retain many of the latter's ontological failings. 
Significantly, this tendency to neglect important issues of human mental ontology 
is also visible in earlier work within the behavioural tradition, most notably Herbert 
Simon's development of the notion of bounded rationality (Simon 1947, 1955, 1956)26. 
Consequently Simon's work nicely illustrates my criticism of behavioural accounts more 
generally. In descJibing the 'administrative man' found in actual economjc situations, as 
opposed to the rational economic man of neoclassical theory, Simon observes that 
economic rationality rests on a number of highly unrealistic assumptions. He emphasises, 
for instance, that rather than possessing complete knowledge of all the alternatives open 
to them and the possible consequences of each alternative, individuals typically have to 
seek out available actions and on doing so know only imperfectly the possible 
consequences of these actions, because of both unce11ainty and limited computational 
power. Furthermore, individuals generally have no simple way of comparing 
heterogeneous consequences, in contrast to the consistent utility measure of rational 
choice theory. 
In his early work, Simon (1947) describes the kind of procedures that agents 
employ when faced with having to act in such circumstances. One such procedure is to 
look for satisfactorY, choices instead of optimal ones; another to replace abstract, global 
goals with tangible sub-goals, whose achievement can be observed and measured; a third 
to divide up the decision-making problem among a group, with their efforts coordinated 
by means of a structure of communications and authOlity relations. In subsequent work 
Simon then set about formalising these findings into the 'administrative man' conception 
of the human agent, describing the sort of rationality exhibited by such agents as 
'bounded' rationality (Simon 1955, 1956). Two concepts are central to Simon's formal 
theory of bounded rationality: search and satisficing. In contrast to marginalist theoJies of 
search (e.g. Stigler 1961), Simon proposes that a decision-maker forms some aspiration as 
to how good an alternative he should find. As soon as an alternative that meets this level 
of aspiration is discovered, the search process, guided by computationally simple rules of 
thumb, ends and that alternative is chosen. Simon calls this mode of choice 'satisficing', 
26 See Augier (200 I), Augier and March (200 I, 2002) and Earl (2002) for recent surveys of Simon's 
contributions to economics . 
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capturing the idea that an individual seeks a satisfactory, rather than the best, available 
alternati ve. 
Now the reason for citing Simon's. work as a good illustration of the ontological 
deficiencies of the behavioural approach is the fact that Simon fails to explain how the 
processes involved in bounded rationality function at the mental level. In particular, 
Simon provides no account of how the processes of satisficing and search fit in with the 
hierarchical nature of consciousness and as a result, no explanation of the role of (for 
example) unconscious influences on behaviour, or the significance of differences between 
different kinds of knowledge27 . Geoff Hodgson (1988: 100) argues that since bounded 
rationality still ultimately rests on a means-ends calculation, albeit a boundedly rational 
calculation, this would seem to imply that the processes involved in search and satisficing 
take place in the discursively conscious mind. Whatever is the case here, however, the 
important point is that while Simon ' s ideas represent an impOltant advance over rational 
choice models of decision-making, they, like modern behavioural theory, are found 
wanting because of their neglect of human ontology. 
Before I move on from behavioural economics, it is interesting to note two 
features of Simon's work that may in part explain his just-noted neglect of important 
aspects of mental ontology. The first of these is his commitment to empiricism28 , a 
methodology that emphasises the need to formalise theOlies and evaluate them according 
to empirical testing. From such a perspective the observability and measurability of 
phenomena is crucial, presenting obvious difficulties for providing explanations in terms 
of subjective, qualitative, conscious mental states and unconscious processes. A second, 
related observation comes from Simon's contributions to the field of cognitive science 
(Newell and Simon 1972; Simon 1964, 1966)29, where he writes from a (symbolic) 
artificial intelligence perspective. On this view human reasoning and thinking are to be 
understood in terms of information processing, a consequence of which (as I noted 
27 However as Hodgson (1988 : 287) notes , away from his formal theory of bounded rationality Simon does 
refer (albeit inconsistently) to the unconsciolls realm. Furthermore, in his brief discllssion of Hayek's work 
on mind, Simon (1992: 26-27) clearly demonstrates his awareness of notions of tacit knowledge and 
subconscious know-how. 
28 For instance, see Simon's Nobel lecture (Simon 1977). The empiricism of behavioural economics 
continues to the present day, one sign of which is the close connection between it and experimental 
economics. 
29 On which see Hands (2001), chapter 4, and Sent (1997) . 
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earlier) is that the importance of categories such as consciousness and intentionality tend 
to be downgraded. 
Looking beyond behavioural economics, which I argued to be highly significant in 
this context because of the present prominence of behavioural accounts of decision-
making and agency, a second writer who warrants some discussion here is Friedrich 
Hayek. Hayek's work in economics , political philosophy and epistemology repeatedly 
raises issues of human ontology3° and a number of these themes are found in the essays in 
this dissertation . To take just one example, Fleetwood (1995, 1997) demonstrates that 
Hayek's work exhibits an increasing awareness of the concept of tacit knowledge. In his 
early work, while aware of the distinction between knowledge in the form of facts and 
knowledge in the form of skills (Hayek 1937: 50), and the existence of knowledge 
embedded in rules, practices, habits and institutions (Hayek 1945: 528), Fleetwood shows 
that Hayek initially makes no use of these notions . In 1952 Hayek then demonstrates his 
awareness of Ryle ' s distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' (Hayek 1952: 
39), but it is not until the 1960s that Hayek begins to use Ryle's and Polanyi's insights in 
his own work (e.g. Hayek 1960, 1967, 1988). One of the most important uses here is in 
Hayek's account of the functioning of the social rules of conduct (Hayek 1960, 1973, 
1983) that play a crucial role in his account of spontaneous order by making individual 
behaviour relatively predictable. 
Hayek's work on these more substantive topics is clearly of interest given that 
these are issues that I deal with throughout my dissertation. Yet what makes Hayek 
pmticularly interesting here is that, in addition to addressing issues of human ontology in 
his economics, Hayek also wrote explicitly on the mind, most notably in his book on 
theoretical psychology The Sensory Order (hereafter referred to as SO). Although finally 
published in 1952, many of the ideas contained in the book date back to a paper written 
by Hayek in 1921. The book complises Hayek ' s criticism of the psychology of perception 
and the philosophy of mind from before 1918, both of which were dominated by the ideas 
of Ernst Mach3 }, plus Hayek's objections to more recent work in behaviourism and 
Gestalt theory. Hayek's starting-point is Mach's universe of sensations, which he tenns 
the sensory order. The book's main thesis is that there are actually two 'orders' in which 
30 On the relation of Hayek' s work on mind and human agency to that of other Austrian writers, see Boettke 
(1994), Cubeddy (1993), Hodgson (1988), Oakley (1997,1999) and Runde (1988) . 
31 See de Vries (1994) for a more detailed account of the relationship between Hayek's and Mach's ideas. 
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we arrange the objects in the world: the physical order, which classifies events as similar 
or different according to whether they produce similar or different other external events; 
and the sensory order, which classifies events according to their sensory properties. 
Contrary to Mach, Hayek argues that there is no simple one-to-one correspondence 
between the elements of the two orders ; events which appear to our senses to be of the 
same kind may be different in the physical order, and vice. versa. The relation between the 
sensory order of the human mind and the physical order of external events is the central 
problem that Hayek addresses in SO. 
Of primary interest to me here is the conception of mind that Hayek develops in 
SO and the relation between this conception and the rest of Hayek's work, notably his 
economics. As Smith (1997) shows, Hayek's model of the mind is a 'connectionist' one, 
whereby all attributes of mental experience are explained in terms of, and are reduced to 
being nothing more than, the system of connections of corresponding patterns of nerve-
excitations32 . Now in advancing such an account, certain characteristics of connectionist 
models of mind are found in Hayek's own account. The first of these is that a 
connectionist stance encourages a view of human reason that emphasises its creative and 
contextual aspects , as well as the importance of non-propositional forms of knowledge 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1988, Smith 1997). This is clearly in keeping with Hayek's 
awareness, and sub§equent use, of tacit knowledge in his later economics, and as Birner 
(1994) notes, we can also sees aspects of Hayek's work on subjectivism, complex 
systems, the limitations of knowledge and evolutionary arguments in SO. 
Yet Hayek's work on the mind in SO is not a perfect fit with his work elsewhere. 
In particular, by virtue of its eliminativist stance towards conscious experience, Hayek's 
connectionism, as with connectionism in general, is weak in its account of consciousness 
and deliberate, purposeful , conscious thinking (see Smith 1997; Weimer 1979, 1982). For 
instance, Smith (1997) notes the difficulty of dealing with mental causation in a 
connectionist framework33, meaning the relation between reason, choice and action, 
which is central to Hayek's methodological individualism in economics. Similarly 
Hayek's account puts little emphasis on the nature of consciousness: its unity, 
qualitativeness, relative stability over time and so on . The overall picture, then, is mixed . 
• 32 See also Agonito (1975), Birner (1999) and Dempsey (1996) on Hayek 's conception of mind . 
33 Hodgson (1988: 114-5) makes the related observation that in SO Hayek downgrades concepts such as 
purpose and action , in a way that goes against hi s (and other Austri ans) use of these terms elsewhere. 
\ 
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While Hayek addresses issues of human ontology in his work in economics, and also 
wlites explicitly on human ontology elsewhere, these two strands in his work are not 
wholly consistent, due largely to his commitment to a connectionist account of the mind. 
_The two examples considered so far represent two extremes in the treatment of 
mental ontology in heterodox economic thought. The behavioural tradition largely 
neglects such issues, whereas Hayek writes explicitly but inconsistently on the mind. 
Between these extremes it is difficult to generalise. Many heterodox writers are explicitly 
concerned with decision-making and the inadequacy of the dominant, neoclassical 
conception. Yet often this concern, while cOlTectly highlighting limitations with rational 
choice models, repeats the neoclassical neglect of ontology. 
George Shackle's work on decision-making under uncertainty (Shackle 1949, 
1969, 1970, 1983) is a case in point. Shackle takes as his starting-point the distinction 
between risk and uncertainty; for Shackle the use of probabilities (whether objective or 
subjective) to indicate the reliability of occurrence of specified outcomes is inappropriate 
where an individual has to choose an action in a situation of uncertainty. Situations of 
uncertainty are those in which an individual faces a 'crucial' decision, the making of 
which will, by definition, destroy the possibility of making that decision again. Since 
many, or most, significant economic decisions involve uncertainty rather than risk, 
rational choice mC(dels are inappropriate in economics. In proposing an alternative theory 
of decision-making that incorporates this insight, Shaclde provides a much stronger 
account of the roles that time, uncertainty and expectations play in human agency. Yet as 
various commentators have noted (e.g., Ford 1994: 3; Oakley 2002: 154), Shackle's 
account makes little reference to the related psychological and philosophical literature on 
the mind. 
In examining some of the most significant aspects of the treatment of mental 
ontology in heterodox economics, I have so far dwelt on largely negative themes, whether 
it is the absence of an explicit mental ontology or the presence of competing accounts of 
the mind. Now though r want to conclude this section by highlighting two instances of 
contemporary heterodox writers who have sought to bring issues of mental ontology to 
the fore. The first is Geoff Hodgson's work on habits and the second, Jon Elster's work 
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on emotion34 . While wliting from quite different perspectives, what each of these projects 
shares is the attempt to take seriously some otherwise neglected aspect of human mental 
ontology. 
Geoff Hodgson's work on the concept of habit is a central feature of his 
contribution to the revival of the old institutionalist tradition in contemporary heterodox 
economics. For Hodgson, as for the founders of old institutionalism such as Commons, 
Veblen and Mitchell, habits are crucial to any pOltrayal of the human agene5• In 
emphasising the importance of habits, defined by Hodgson as 'a largely non-deliberative 
and self-actuating propensity to engage in a previously adopted pattern of behaviour' 
(1998: 178), Hodgson's point is not simply that the actions of human beings are often 
pelformed skilfully but with little or no conscious reflection. While undoubtedly true, if 
this alone were the significance of the concept of habit then the neglect of the category in 
mainstream economics might not be terribly impOltane6• Rather as Hodgson 
demonstrates, the implication of recognising the role of habits can be to change radically 
how we conceive of categories such as human action, knowledge and institutions37 • 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Hodgson's work on habit for the project 
that I pursue here, especially given my earlier comments on both neoclassical and 
heterodox writers, is that he deals with the issue of how the particular category of interest 
(in this case habit), fits in with other important aspects of human ontology. In somewhat 
earlier work, Hodgson provides a critique of what he calls 'rationalist' conceptions of 
action that portray all action as the product of rational calculation (Hodgson, 1988). 
34 In fact, a third example of a heterodox project that deals explicitly with issues of human mental ontology 
has already been mentioned in this introduction, namely critical realism. Since this is considered at length in 
my first essay, I will not include a further summary of the project and its concerns here. 
35 In this, and in their conception of human agency in general, the founders of old institutionalism drew on 
the work of the instinct philosophers such as James and McDougall , and pragmatist philosophers such as 
Pierce. The revival in pragmatist thought has already been commented on in these introductory remarks, 
and it is therefore interesting to note a corresponding revival in instinct psychology, seen in the work of 
authors such as Cosmides and Tooby (1994a, 1994b), Plotkin (1994) and Rebel' 1993. 
36 Where mainstream economists have addressed the idea of habits, the tendency has been to regard them in 
rational choice terms , e ither by viewing them as the product of an earlier, ration , decision , or as a deliberate 
means of simplifying rational decision making (e.g. Becker 1992; Pollak 1970). 
37 For instance, on the connection between habit and accounts of institutions and social structure, see 
Hodgson (1998, 2002, 2003); on the role of habits and rule following in rational choice, see Hodgson 
(1997). 
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Drawing on vatious kinds of evidence, including philosophical and psychological 
arguments, Hodgson argues in favour of a hierarchical conception of the conscious mind 
that recognises the unconscious influences on action (such as habits) as well as the 
conscious, calculated, motives. Subsequently (Hodgson 1998) argues for the need to 
reconcile the purposeful, novel and creative aspects of human behaviour with the role of 
habits, rather than being forced to downgrade the significance of one or other of these 
aspects. 
My second illustration of a contemporary writer in economics focusing explicitly 
on issues of human ontology is Jon Elster, whose most recent work examines the role that 
emotion plays in human behaviour (Elster 1998, 1999). As with the concept of habit, 
emotions have largely been neglected in economics , save for isolated appearances in 
response to specific issues (e.g., Rabin 1993; Gifford 2002; Kaufman 1999)38. Yet 
emotion would seem to play a central role in many areas of behaviour to which 
economists have traditionally applied rational choice models, such as decisions 
concerning savings and investment, gambling, insurance, bargaining, altruism and so on. 
Crucially, Elster argues that the role that emotions play in influencing behaviour is 
inadequately conceived of if they are reduced either to 'psychic costs' and 'benefits', or 
otherwise to sources of preferences. Rather, emotions such as anger, fear, love and the 
like, also affect aQ individual's ability to make rational choices in the first place. 
Therefore an adequate conception of the human agent in economics requires an ontology 
of the human mind that explicitly incorporates emotion. 
Philosophy of Mind in Economics 
In examining the situation within which my dissertation emerges, I have so far restricted 
my attention to the treatment in economics of issues concerned directly with human 
mental ontology. I now want to broaden my focus by highlighting two instances of wider 
issues of philosophy of mind that have been brought into economics; firstly the work of 
John Davis on the notion of collective intentionality, . and secondly, Alexander 
Rosenberg's critique of folk psychology. 
Davis (2002) draws on recent philosophical work on the notion of collective 
intentionality (Bratman 1993, 1999, Gilbert 1989; Tuomela 1991, 1995; Searle 1990, 
38 See also Loewenstein (2000). 
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1995) in order to support heterodox conceptions of agency that emphasise the 'social 
embeddedness' of the indi vidual agent39• In contrast to the atomistic accounts of 
mainstream economics, in which agents are free of significant social attachments when 
they act, heterodox accounts stress the importance of social factors on individual activity. 
Yet for heterodox writers to sustain such a view requires that they demonstrate a 
difference between the way that individuals act when they are part of an organised group 
(i.e. in Davis's terms when they act socially), as opposed to when they act alone (i.e. non-
socially). Davis seeks to understand this difference in terms of individuals acting in 
groups as having 'shared' or 'we' intentions about the groups of which they are members, 
using the notion of collective intentionality to sustain the idea of a 'shared' intention. 
While the distinctiory between social and non-social actions seems relatively clear 
in terms of ordinary language, with people using 'I' intentions when they see themselves 
as acting independently of others and 'we' intentions when focusing on their actions as 
members of groups, the distinction has only recently found expression in the 
philosophical literature on collective intentionality. In this literature, 'we' intentions are 
intentions that individuals attribute, and believe that others attribute, to the individuals 
that make up the group of which they are members. When acting in a social setting each 
individual is therefore conceived of as possessing some form of 'we' intention (for 
instance, 'we have d~cided to adopt a following policy', or 'we are going on this trip', 
etc.) while believing that each member of the group possesses a similar attitude40• 
Therefore on this conception social activity is explained in terms of 'structures of 
reciprocally related we-intentions possessing a mutually reinforcing character. These 
structures of interaction . .. function as the skeletons of social activity and therefore of the 
institutions and social values that are the products of social activity' (Davis 2002: 15). 
A second, quite, different engagement with issues of philosophy of mind 111 
economics is found in the work of Alexander Rosenberg (1992, 1995, 1998 and 
elsewhere). In rejecting the scientific status of modern economics on the grounds of its 
failure to generate increasingly accurate predictions, Rosenberg argues that the cause of 
39 Two prominent examples of which have already been discussed : the critical realist theory of social 
ontology (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1979; Lawson 1997) and the (old) institutionalist approach of Hodgson 
(2002). 
40 Notice that such 'shared' intentions are non-holistic ; it is the individuals that make up the group that each 
hold a ' we' intention, not the group that has an intention over and above the intentions of the individuals 
that make it up. 
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etc.) while believing that each member of the group possesses a similar attitude40 • 
Therefore on this conception social activity is explained in terms of 'stlUctures of 
reciprocally related we-intentions possessing a mutually reinforcing character. These 
stlUctures of interaction ... function as the skeletons of social activity and therefore of the 
institutions and social values that are the products of social activity' (Davis 2002: 15). 
A second, quite, different engagement with issues of philosophy of mind In 
economics is found in the work of Alexander Rosenberg (1992, 1995, 1998 and 
elsewhere). In rejecting the scientific status of modern economics on the grounds of its 
failure to generate increasingly accurate predictions, Rosenberg argues that the cause of 
39 Two prominent examples of which have already been discussed: the critical realist theory of social 
ontology (Archer 1995 ; Bhaskar 1979; Lawson 1997) and the (old) institutionalist approach of Hodgson 
(2002). 
40 Notice that such 'shared ' intentions are non-holistic; it is the individuals that make up the group that each 
hold a ' we' intention, not the group that has an intention over and above the intentions of the individuals 
that make it up . 
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this failure can be traced to economists' continued commitment to intentionalistic 
explanations of human action. By explaining action in terms of the preferences and 
expectations of actors, economists' theories of rational choice employ what philosophers 
term 'folk psychology', and this, according to Rosenberg, has been shown to be 
problematic in light of recent philosophical work. 
Now I do not intend here to examine the broader context within which Rosenberg 
makes these arguments, in pmticular their relation to his earlier work or the validity of the 
empiricist philosophy of science that they embodl l . Instead I want to briefly outline 
some of the philosophical arguments that Rosenberg draws on in order to claim that it is a 
commitment to folk psychology that causes economics to be inaccurate and vague in its 
predictions. The first of these is a problem of potential circularity in intentionalistic 
explanations of action. According to folk psychology, beliefs and desires provide an agent 
with reasons for action, and those reasons in turn provide the causal explanation for the 
agent's action. Now in order to employ this sort of intentionalistic explanation of an 
agent's action, we must know that agent's beliefs. The most obvious way to find out what 
these are is to ask the agent what they believe. Yet in order to connect an agents reported 
beliefs to their ' actual beliefs' requires an intentionalistic explanation of their speech act. 
The result is a potential regress, as any reported intentional states stand in need of 
interpretation in intentional terms. 
This first line of reasoning has been powelfully challenged by Cottrell (1995) 
who, distinguishing both a strong and weak version of Rosenberg's argument, finds a 
defence against both in the form of Dennett's (1987) intentional systems theory. The 
second criticism that Rosenberg levels at folk psychology explanations is taken from 
philosophers who hold an eliminative materialist conception of the mind. Such wliters 
(Stich 1983, Patricia Churchland 1986, 1987; Paul Churchland 1984, 1992) take folk 
psychology to be an unscientific explanatory model of action because the intentional 
vocabulary of beliefs and desires refers to things that they consider simply not to exist. 
Consequently, or so the argument goes, for as long as economics continues to seek to 
explain behaviour in intentional terms , rather than in terms of modern neuroscience, it 
will remain inaccurate and vague in its predictions. Yet such a position requires an 
acceptance of an eliminative materialist view of the mind, something that philosophers 
like Searle are unprepared to do. For Searle, intentional states such as beliefs and desires 
41 See Hands (2001: 334- 341) for a broader di scussion of Rosenberg's ideas. 
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are caused by, but not reducible to, lower level physical processes in the brain. 
Consequently intentional states are · legitimate entities to refer to in explanations of 
behaviour. For more on the implications of Searle's biological naturalism for folk 
psychol9gy, see Searle (1991, 1994a, especially the appendix to chapter 2). 
While these are perhaps the most philosophically significant criticisms of folk 
psychology that Rosenberg draws on, he also discusses a host of other problems 
associated with such an intentionalistic explanatory framework . For instance, Rosenberg 
notes the following difficulty concerning the logical relationship between reasons and 
causes. Within the covering law framework of scientific explanation accepted by 
Rosenberg, reasons are only explanatory if they bring about actions. Yet often agents 
have reasons for acting that are patently not the cause of what they end up doing. 
Rosenberg (1995: 34-35) cites the example of the jogger who runs ten kilometres a day 
and explains her action , truthfully, as a result of the belief that running is good for her. 
Yet the actual cause of her behaviour may well be an addiction to the endorphins released 
during the process of running. The implication of such an example is simply the warning 
that being able to establish the reasons that an actor has for some behaviour, even where 
these reasons appear ' rational', is not the same thing as establishing the causes of 
behaviour. 
Not surprisl ngly, Rosenberg's analysis of the state of modern economics and the 
cause of its alleged plight has generated substantial criticism and debate, much of which 
is summarised by Hands (2001: 340-341). From the perspective I adopt in this 
dissertation , there are two principal problems with Rosenberg's position. The first, 
already mentioned, is that it ignores the Searlean-type response to criticisms of folk 
psychology based on notions of supervenience and emergence. The second is that in 
adhering to a traditional Humean philosophical framework, Rosenberg Ignores 
developments in contemporary philosophy of science42 . This has two notable 
consequences. One is that were Rosenberg to acknowledge alternative conceptions of 
scientific explanation, he would be able to retain many of the reservations he has about 
folk psychology without being forced to conclude that such explanations are necessarily 
unscientific. The second is that the very premise for Rosenberg's critique of economists' 
use of folk psychology, that economics fails to be scientific because of its poor predictive 
performance, is put into doubt. 
42 See Hands (1988). 
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IV SUMMARY 
Having covered a large amount of ground in a relatively short space in these introductory 
notes, I want to conclude by returning once more to the main theme of my dissertation. 
The three essays that follow these notes are all concerned with one thing: uncovering and 
Clitically assessing the accounts that various approaches to economics give of the mental 
processes involved in economic decision-making. The form that this assessment takes is 
thoroughly ontological, reflecting my belief that such accounts must be judged, at least in 
part, in telms of how closely they cOlTespond to actual human mental ontology (or our 
best accounts of that ontology). Numerous important issues are raised by such an 
exercise, including the nature of rational choice, of knowledge and of action, the 
applicability and limitations of the vatious conceptions of agency under consideration, 
and ultimately the usefulness of ontological enquiry into substantive economic topics. 
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SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN SUBJECT IN 
CRITICAL REALISM! 
I INTRODUCTION 
While many aspects of Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality2 have been the subject of 
critical scrutiny and development, its conception of human agency appears to have 
received relatively little coverage in the literature. This is a pity, since Lawson advances a 
distinctive account of the human subject that plays an impOltant role in his claims about 
society and social science. 
In this essay, I examine the model of cognitive functioning associated with the 
human subject in E&R. By 'cognitive functioning' I mean the various levels of 
consciousness at which the human mind is said to operate and the type of knowledge that 
functions at each of these levels. Two realms in particular concern me: the discursive 
conscious, at which level operate the reflected upon, thought about, brain states that 
occur, for example, when we try to calculate the first ten prime numbers or set about 
planning a holiday; and the tacit subconscious, at which level operate the non-reflected 
upon, unattended to, brain states such as my knowledge of the vatious keyboard ShOltcutS 
" 
in Microsoft Word that enable me, for example, to italicise words without my having to 
think about which keys to press. 
While the idea that the human mind functions at vatious degrees of consciousness 
(from the wholly discursive to the non-conscious) is surely light, I argue in this essay that 
Lawson's account of tacit knowledge is unable to sustain the differences in functioning 
between discursive and tacit knowledge that his theory of social reality relies upon. In 
developing the argument, I first consider the impOltance of the human subject's cognitive 
functioning to the theory of social reality Lawson describes in E&R. I then outline the 
I This paper has been published in the November 2002 edition of the Cambridge lournal of EconOlnics 
(Faulkner 2002b). My thanks to Iochen Runde, three anonymous referees and to ' participants at the 
Workshop on Realism and Economics (November 2000), King's College, Cambridge, and the INEM 
session of the ASSA meetings (January 2001) in New Orleans, LA., for helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of the paper. 
2 In the text, E&R denotes Economics a/ld Reality. 
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particular model of cognitive functioning Lawson attIibutes to the human subject. In 
section three, I set out my criticism of his conception of tacit knowledge. 
In the second half of the essay, I propose a possible resolution of the problem, 
drawing on John Searle's work on the mind. The key addition from Searle turns out to be 
the technical notion of intentionality - a capacity by which some mental states are 
intIinsically about, or directed towards, some objects or states of affairs in the world. 
From an account of intentionality, Searle produces an explanation of both consciously 
reasoned behaviour and tacit knowledge that corresponds closely to the cognitive 
functioning Lawson attributes to the human subject, but which evades my original 
criticism. 
11 THE HUMAN SUBJECT IN ECONOMICS AND REALITy3 
Lawson's ultimate aim In E&R is to propose an alternative model of explanation for 
economics and, to this end, he emphasises the need to ensure that the methods to be used 
are consistent with the nature of the subject matter to be investigated. For economics, this 
subject matter is social reality, which is why, in E&R, Lawson devotes considerable space 
to developing an l!nderstanding of the nature of society. The result is a theory of social 
ontology that centres on two key elements: an account of the social structures, such as 
rules, positions and relations that govern and facilitate human actions, together with an 
account of the human subject. 
The particular aspect of Lawson 's description of the human subject to be 
examined in this essay, the various levels of consciousness at which the human mind is 
said to operate, bears directly on two areas of his theory of social reality. The first of 
3 In focusing exclusively on Lawson's conception of the human subject, and specifically the notion of tacit 
knowledge in E&R, I do not intend to address the important issue of the genealogy of Lawson's critical 
realist account in rel at ion to the work ofBhaskar (1978,1979) and others (e.g., Archer 1995,2000; Giddens 
1976, 1984). Significantly, I do not therefore examine whether the same criticisms I make of Lawson's 
position can also be made of Bhaskar and other critical realist writers. On this, see Hodgson (l999b). I 
concentrate here on Lawson's account, rather than critical realist accounts in general, as it is Lawson's work 
that has impacted most directly on economics. 
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these areas IS the capacity for purposeful4 behaviour that Lawson ascribes to human 
beings, whereby action is 'governed by reasons so that it is always directed by some 
beliefs, or knowledge, and towards some end(s)' (Lawson 1997: l77). The process of 
reasoning associated with such goal-driven behaviour must take place in the discursive 
conscious, since it requires reflection upon our (often competing) aims and our 
knowledge of the world that dictates how best to achieve these aims. 
The second area of Lawson's theory of social reality relating to the cognitive 
functioning of the human subject concerns the knowledge that human beings possess 
about social structures. Lawson posits the existence of various types of social structure; 
social rules or practices, social positions and social relations being the principal 
candidates. In order to be sensitive to the nature of these structures, human beings must 
draw on their knowledge of them whenever they act in a social context. Lawson notes that 
such knowledge is often impeIfect and usually tacit, this latter characteristic meaning that 
such knowledge is typically drawn on, and shapes action without being the subject of 
discursive thought. Consider an example: although the shared social practice of queuing 
at the supermarket in order to pay for goods appears to be known to most of us, and our 
behaviour reveals this to be so, we tend to conform to this practice 'automatically', 
without conscious reflection. 
The Cognitive Capacities of Lawson's Human Subject 
At issue is whether the account that Lawson gives of the human subject's cognitive 
functioning is adequate in terms of its ability to support the fOllTIS of behaviour his theory 
of social ontology requires. I have identified two aspects of behaviour as being important 
to this theory: the functioning of beliefs, intentions and knowledge at the discursive level 
of consciousness that generates the reasons behind purposeful actions, and the functioning 
of knowledge concerning the nature of social structures that typically takes place at the 
4 Lawson (1997: 175) uses the word ' intentional' as a synonym for ' purposeful' . This usage, whereby 
intentionality refers to the direct~dness of action, contrasts with that of Searle, who uses intentionality 
primarily to refer to the directedness of many mental states . Therefore the intentionality of Lawson's human 
subject is quite different to the intentionality of Searle's. To avoid confusion, I will restrict my use of 
intentionality to Searle ' s meaning of the word. 
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tacit level of consciousness. I turn now to the model of cognitive functioning that Lawson 
develops in E&R to account for these two aspects of behaviour. 
Lawson identifies three basic levels of consciousness at which the human mind 
operates: the discursive conscious, the tacit subconscious and the unconscious. The 
strategy employed to explain each of these levels is to outline the types or aspects of 
behaviour they make possible. At the discursive level, he tells us, operate the 'motives or 
needs which stimulate or prompt action and the overall plans or projects that may be 
formulated in line with them' (Lawson 1997: 178). These, he continues, 'tend to have 
direct bearing or purchase only in relatively unusual circumstances, such as moments of 
significant changes in possibilities and constraints' and so only 'bear on the reasons for 
patticular actions rather than the modes in which they are chronically carried out'. 
On the basis of this passage, I take Lawson to mean by the discursive conscious 
the 'reflected upon' or 'attended to' realm of consciousness or awareness. This would 
seem to follow from his mention of the 'reasons for particular actions' that function at 
this level, since I argued earlier that this process of reasoning involves conscIOUS 
reflection upon our situation . This interpretation of the discursive realm is further 
supported by Lawson' s charactelisation of the tacit subconscious, where the 'reflected 
upon' (Lawson 1997: 177) nature of the discursive is contrasted with the 'without 
conscious reflectio!!' (Lawson 1997: 178) nature of the tacit subconscious. 
As before, the majOlity of what Lawson tells us about the tacit realm concerns the 
type of behaviour that functions at this level. In particular, he notes that 'much day to day 
conduct is concerned precisely with the question of possible modes in which relevant 
actions can be catTied out' (ibid.). These modes, he argues, must typically be tacitly 
determined since the continuous nature of the events and actions that must be monitored 
and controlled rule out a discursive, reflected-upon, thought process. One consequence of 
this, he notes, is that 'much of the body of knowledge and skills drawn upon in action will 
be known only tacitly' (ibid.), being drawn upon without being thought about. What 
Lawson has in mind here, in terms of those things we typically know tacitly, is not only 
the social rules we adhere to on a regular basis, but such things as familiar geography -
those routes we can navigate while 'lost in thought' - and the like. In all, I take Lawson to 
mean that our capacity for tacit knowledge essentially concerns knowledge of those 
things in the world that we are most used to acting in accordance with. 
I shall concentrate on Lawson's conceptions of discursive and tacit knowledge in 
the remainder of this paper. But before I do so, it is necessary to mention the unconscious 
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level of cognitive functioning that also features In his account of the human subject. 
Lawson (Lawson 1997: 179) desclibes as unconscious those 'fOlms of cognition and 
dispositions which appear either to be inaccessible to discursive conscious because they 
were formed before the development of linguistic competence, or to constitute items that 
are repressed from discursive consciousness, being inhibited from appearing there in 
anything other than (possibly significantly) distorted fOlm'. These dispositions, according 
to Lawson, represent unconscious 'needs and motives' (Lawson 1997: 184) which 
influence the actions that individuals take. In particular, Lawson cites Giddens' notion of 
ontological security - whereby people possess an unconscious need to engage in routine 
forms of behaviour in order to avoid anxiety - as a partial factor in the widely routinised 
nature of human behaviour. 
Having highlighted the role of the unconscious realm in Lawson's account, I shall 
put it to one side for the remainder of this paper. Although an important part of his theory 
of social reality, the unconscious is not directly involved in the problem I will identify in 
Lawson's account of the human subject. In moving towards this problem, I now want to 
focus explicitly on the types of knowledge that Lawson ascribes to the human subject. His 
account of the realms of consciousness at which the mind operates suggests that there are 
two principal types of knowledge to consider: discursive and tacit knowledge. 
What char~cterises each type of knowledge is the degree to which conscious 
reflection is involved, when that knowledge is drawn on in action. The sort of knowledge 
that gets brought to mind when we reflect upon possible courses of action to take, such as 
beliefs about the way things are in the world, functions causally in behaviour by virtue of 
being brought into the discursive conscious and its contents analysed. I telm this 
'discursive knowledge'. The second type of knowledge found in Lawson's account is 
' tacit knowledge '. Such knowledge is drawn on without conscious reflection, as with the 
earlier example of 'automatically' knowing what it means to queue in the supermarket. 
The only other distinction Lawson draws between discursive and tacit knowledge, 
other than the degree to which conscious reflection is involved in the functioning of each 
type, comes when he describes the process of acquiring tacit knowledge. The first stage of 
this process is typically the discursive acquisition of some piece of knowledge: people are 
taught the ' rules of (a possibly foreign) language, how to play a musical instrument or a 
game, how to hold cutlery or a pen, the highway code, and so forth' (Lawson 1997: 178). 
Such knowledge is discursive in the sense described above, since in playing the 
instrument or speaking the language, the rules are consciously applied at the time of 
32 
acting. With familiarity comes the acquisition of tacit knowledge of these rules, 'with 
time, such rules become internalised' (ibid.), at which point one can act according to the 
rules without having to think about their contents. 
III THE PROBLEM - WHAT IS TACIT KNOWLEDGE? 
What, then, is the problem with Lawson ' s account of human knowledge? Let us take a 
widely understood example of something that may either be discursively or tacitly known 
and then consider how we are to apply Lawson's model to this situation. My example will 
be the rules of a game, such as chess . A player thinking about what to play next in a game 
of chess must draw on his knowledge of the rules governing the legal moves of each piece 
and the definitions of such terms as 'check ', 'castling', ' en passant' and so on. Consider 
first the novice, who possesses discursive knowledge of these rules. In deciding on his 
next move, he consciously applies whatever rules are relevant to the piece he is 
considering moving. To move the king legally, for example, means thinking through the 
rules to determine that such and such a move is allowed, while other moves are not. 
Contrast the novice with the expert, who is sufficiently familiar with the game to 
know its rules tacitly. The expert ' s knowledge is still a causal factor in his decision-
making - both play~'s ' actions are sensitive to the rules - but unlike the novice, the 
expert does not need to think through the content of each rule when drawing on his 
knowledge. Rather, while his tacit subconscious ensures that he operates within the rules 
of the game, his discursive conscious is likely to be concerned with aspects of strategy. 
The question that an account of tacit knowledge must answer is how it is that the 
knowledge of the rules possessed by the expert player is able to function causally in 
behaviour. For the novice, his knowledge of the rules functions by virtue of being brought 
into the discursive conscious. But the expert's knowledge of the rules also functions 
causally, this time without entering the discursive mind. 
Lawson's explanation of the functioning of tacit knowledge is simply to say that 
the expert has ' internalised ' the rules of the game. The trouble is that in the absence of 
any additional exposition of the term, all that this achieves is the renaming of tacit 
knowledge to internalised knowledge. What is needed, and what Lawson fails to provide, 
is an unpacking of the notion of tacit (or internalised) knowledge. My contention in the 
remainder of this essay is that John Searle's work on the human mind provides us with 
just this. While criticising accounts of the human subject that propose unconscious rule-
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following, Searle observes: 'Our picture of unconscious mental states is that they are just 
like conscious states only minus the consciousness' and then asks, 'But what exactly is 
that supposed to mean?' (SearJe 1995: 128). My criticism of Lawson takes the form of the 
same kind of question: what form does tacit knowledge take and how does it differ from 
reflected upon, discursive, knowledge? Of course, any answer to this question will be 
speculative to some degree, because the field of cognitive science is itself unresolved on 
these issues. However I think it can be shown that Searle's account of consciousness, 
intentionality and Background not only sheds further light on the nature of the problem 
identified in Lawson's account, but also offers a route to overcoming these failings. 
IV SEARLE ON THE HUMAN AGENT 
According to Searle, what distinguishes reflected upon, discursive, knowledge from non-
discursive, tacit, knowledge is the intentionality of the former. By intentionality, Searle 
means the specific property possessed by some mental states by which they are 
intIinsically 'directed at, or are about or of, or refer to, or aim at, states of affairs in the 
world' (Searle 1999: 64). He goes on to argue that many of our conscious mental states 
function causally in, our behaviour by viltue of being intentional. He then argues that 
intentional states can only function in association with non-intentional, 'Background', 
knowledge. What I want to suggest is that by identifying Lawson's tacit knowledge with 
Searle's Background, and discursive knowledge with intentional mental states, Searle's 
account of the human subject overcomes the deficiencies in Lawson' s conception . 
Intentionality 
The notion of intentionality remams contentious in cognitive science. Since Searle's 
approach5 to intentionality is fundamental to the other aspects of his work, we must be 
clear about what the Searlean perspective commits us to. If we take Searle's view to be 
the following, that 'it is just a plain fact [about human beings] that, for example, 
sometimes they get thirsty or hungry, they see things, fear things, etc.' (Searle 1994a: 79) 
5 See Intentionality: An Essay in th e Philosophy of th e Mind (Searle 1983) , hereafter referred to simply as 
Intentionality, for a full account of the Searlean approach. 
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and that such states are intrinsically intentional in the sense of being directed at, or about, 
some thing or some state of affairs, then the key thing for Searle to explain is the apparent 
existence of other, non-mental , forms of intentionality. 
~et us put such phenomena into one of two categories. In the first category are 
things like words , maps and pictures that human beings use to represent objects and 
events . The phrase 'The Bank of England', for example, while being non-mental does 
genuinely refer to an institution located in the City of London. In the second category are 
instances of behaviour by systems which appear to imply an element of intentionality: the 
thermostat that perceives changes in temperature, for example, or the leaves that arrange 
themselves on the branches of the tree because of their desire to absorb sunlight. 
How does Searle explain the existence of these non-mental sources of 
intentionality? With respect to the first category, Searle (l994a: 78-82) recognises that 
language, pictures and maps are genuinely intentional in the sense that they literally do 
mean, or refer to , something else. But this intentionality is never intrinsic to the language 
itself; rather it is something which derives from the intentionality of language users and is 
consequently termed 'derived intentionality ' . The second category of phenomena - the 
thermostat and the leaves - are not intentional at all according to Searle's account. While 
it is common in everyday language to speak of something' s behaviour as if it had a 
mentalistic explanation - we may say that the thermostat knows what temperature to keep 
" 
the room at, that it acts if it perceives an unwanted change in conditions - the 
intentionality here is purely metaphorical ('as-if' intentionality in Searle's scheme). There 
is nothing in the thermostat that possesses the intrinsic intentionality of many human 
mental states . 
Intentional Causation 
We are now in a position to consider the importance of intentionality to Searle's account 
of the functioning of the mind. The key thing here is the role that intentionality plays in 
mediating particular types of causal relations between the mind and the external world. 
Consider the following instances of causal contact between mind and world: my seeing an 
object, my remembering an event that took place last year and my desire to go on holiday 
being the cause of my flying abroad. In the first two cases , some aspect of the external 
world causes a particular mental state: the object causes a visual experience and the event 
causes a memory. In the third case the direction of causation is reversed; the desire causes 
11 
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a change in the state of the world. What each example has in common is the presence of 
an intentional as well as causal component: seeing, remembering and intending all 
involve intentional states. 
The particular form of the relationship between intentionality and the mind's 
causal relations to the world is what Searle terms 'intentional causation'. Because our 
interest here is in the way that an individual's knowledge of the world functions causally 
in behaviour, I shall restrict myself from now on to considering just one side of the 
relation: the mind-to-world direction of causation. The essence to intentional causation is 
the proposition that the relationship between intentionality and (mind-to-world) causation 
takes the following form: when an intentional state (such as my desire for a drink of 
water) causes some change in the world (in this case causes me to dlink water) that 
mental state functions as the cause of the resulting behaviour by generating a conscious 
representation of the effect that it causes. 
An additional piece of terminology, the idea of an intentional state's 'conditions 
of satisfaction', enables a more succinct definition of intentional causation. For those 
intentional states whose content is a proposition, such as my belief that it will rain later 
today, one can conceive of a truth condition that corresponds to that state. In the case of 
my belief, for example, it is true if and only if it does rain later today. Since a range of 
intentional modes ~an apply to a given proposition content - I can believe or desire or 
intend that it will rain later today - the notion of a truth condition must be broadened to 
deal with . the fact that, rather than being literally true or false , my desire can either be 
fulfilled or frustrated and my intention, calTied out or not. To capture this idea Searle 
introduces the notion of the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state. These 
conditions state what must occur for a belief to be true, an intention to have been carried 
out, a desire to be fulfilled, and so on. 
The notion of intentional causation can now be stated as follows: when an 
intentional state functions causally with respect to human behaviour, it does so because it 
generates a representation of, and consequently causes, its conditions of satisfaction. 
Consider again my desire for a dJink. According to intentional causation, the desire 
functions as the cause of my subsequently taking a drink - blinging about its conditions 
of satisfaction - by means of generating a conscious representation of my taking a drink. 
The idea behind intentional causation is therefore that an intentional state causes the event 
that it represents because the person concerned seeks to bring about the conditions of 
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satisfaction of that state. More generally, intentional content functions because one thinks 
about the conditions of satisfaction it implies and acts on it. 
So what type of behaviour is associated with intentional causation? In Mind, 
Language ,and Society (Searle 1999: 106) Searle observes that: 
Human behaviour, where rational , functions on the basis of reasons , but the 
reasons explain the behaviour only if the relation between the reason and the 
behaviour is both logical and causal. 
The point here is that the notion of purposeful behaviour only makes sense if the 
reason - one or more mental state - not only causes the resultant behaviour but was also 
meant to cause that behaviour. If my desire for a drink was such that in running to the 
kitchen I tripped and broke my glasses, we would not say that I purposefully set out to 
break my glasses, even though we could cite my desire for a drink as part of the cause. 
'Explanations of rational human behaviour thus essentially employ the apparatus of 
intentional causation' (ibid.) , according to Searle, because if reasons are aimed at 
bringing about a particular effect they do so by representing that effect. 
Since parts of Searle's analysis are clearly reminiscent of Lawson's discussion of 
purposeful behaviour, let us be clear about the similarities and differences. Searle and 
Lawson share a common definition of what it is for behaviour to be purposeful (Lawson 
--... 
(1997: 177), remember, wrote that purposeful action is 'governed by reasons so that it is 
always directed by some beliefs, or knowledge, and towards some end(s)'). Where 
Lawson's account was found wanting was in the absence of an adequate explanation of 
the distinction between the discursive and the tacit levels of mental functioning. More 
specifically, having argued that the reasons that cause behaviour operate at the discursive 
level of consciousness , he fails to account for the difference between discursive and tacit 
knowledge beyond characterising the first in terms of our ' thinking about' its contents 
and the second in terms of our not needing to do this. Searie, in contrast, provides us with 
the apparatus for understanding the functioning of reasons in behaviour, via the concept 
of intentionality. What remains to be specified is the precise connection between 
intentionality and consciousness in Searle's analysis. 
Two aspects of this connection are important. The first, already implied, is that the 
functioning of intentional states in behaviour is a .matter for the (discursive) conscious. 
When the desire for a drink causes me to take a drink, it does so because I am aware of 
my desire and I act upon it. Indeed, this is true regardless of the direction of causation: 
37 
my remembering or perceiving also implies a state of consciousness rather than 
unconsciousness at the time concerned. But what about those intentional states that are 
not, at the present time, conscious? Since at any given time most of our beliefs, 
intentiQns, hopes and so on are unconscious, Searle must explain the difference between 
those neurobiological structures that are unconscious intentional states and those that are 
simply unconscious non-intentional structures. This is the second important aspect of the 
connection between intentionality and consciousness in Searle's account and is refelTed to 
as the 'connection principle'. 
The connection principle (Searle 1994b: 849) states that when we attribute an 
unconscious intentional state to a person , 
we are describing a neurobiological structure not in terms of its actual 
manifestation of occurrent mental properties, but rather in terms of its causal capacity 
to manifest those mental properties in the form of conscious thoughts and conscious 
behaviour. 
In other words the only way to understand the notion of an unconscious 
intentional state S(r), according to Searle, is in terms of the neurobiological structure 
behind that unconscious state being capable of sustaining a conscious state of mode Sand 
"-
content r. Thus while we can (and do) attribute both conscious and unconscious 
intentional states to a person, such an attribution can only be understood in terms of the 
connection principle. 
The Background 
So intentional mental states cause behaviour through their conditions of satisfaction. 
Having decided I should like to read a newspaper this morning, I form the intention to go 
out and buy a newspaper, and this intention is cOlTectly identified as the reason for my 
driving to the paper shop and buying a copy of The Daily Telegraph. According to 
intentional causation, the conditions of satisfaction of my intention both represent and 
cause the effect: my buying a newspaper. Now consider whether the intention alone 
explains my behaviour. In fulfilling the intention, I went to a particular shop, I bought The 
Daily Telegraph rather than The Times or The Guardian, and I drove rather than walked. 
Presumably, these aspects of my behaviour are caused by my possessing other, related, 
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intentional states - beliefs about the nearest shop that sells newspapers, about the easiest 
way to get there and about the relati ve merits of various papers - so that these states also 
played a causal role6 in the functioning of my intention. We may say, then, that a given 
intentionaJ state only functions relative to many other intentional states. Searle (1983: 
141) also recognises this point. Intentional states , he writes 
do not function in an independent or atomistic fashion , for each intentional 
state has its content and determines its conditions of satisfaction only in relation to 
numerous other intentional states. 
This is precisely the point of the preceding example: my intention to buy a 
newspaper could not have functioned without what Searle terms the 'Network' of 
intentional states within which my initial intention exists . The Network includes not just 
the most clearly related beliefs and desires but also the entire set of 'subsidiary 
intentions ... hopes and fears, anxieties and anticipations, feelings of frustration and 
satisfaction', in short, 'the entire holistic network of intentionality' (ibid.). 
The Network clearly covers a vast range of mental life. The sheer breadth and 
depth of the beliefs and desires each one of us possesses at any given time would surely 
be staggering if we ever stopped to think about ourselves in those terms . But while 
'" 
intentionality - as represented by the Network - concerns the purposeful aspects of 
behaviour, we have still to explain the human capacity for tacit-like functioning we earlier 
noted as being relevant to our knowledge of social structures and the like. Searle's 
'Background thesis', the essence of which is that intentional states only function 'given a 
presupposed set of Background capacities that are not just more intentional states' (Searle 
1999: 109), appears to explain just such a capacity. The remainder of this essay considers 
Searle's Background thesis and aims to substantiate the claim that the Background is a 
more appropriate way to conceive oftacit knowledge than that offered by Lawson. 
Firstly then, what exactly is Searle's thesis? As the previous quote implies, Searle 
contends that there is more to the functioning of the mind in purposeful behaviour than 
the Network of intentionality alone. His contention is prompted by considering whether 
6 Since these other states are al so intentional , the nature of this causal role also follows intentional 
causation. In other words, when I drew on my belief concerning the nearest shop, my belief functioned 
causally by representing its own conditions of satisfaction in my (discursively) conscious mind. 
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Network is self-interpreting in the following sense: if we follow out each strand 
ot the 
or n N twork, identifying at each step what determines the conditions of satisfaction of 
of the et' anal state concerned7, will a point be reached such that all conditions of 
the inte~ ~ have been fully determined? Aside from possible technical difficulties 
satisfactJO 
d by the fact that at any given time most of our intentional states are unconscious 
presente 
't may be difficult to individuate states, Searle argues that such a point will not be 
and that I 
reached. 
Instead, as we move out through the Network listing the things that are implicated 
. d termination of our intentional states' conditions of satisfaction, we shall reach a 
10 the e 
. here what we are listing seems too fundamental to be considered as yet more 
pOlOt w 
. . nal states . For example, while it seems to make sense to say that I have a belief 
IOtentlo 
about the location of the nearest shop that sells newspapers and a preference for The 
Daily Telegraph over The Times, it seems wrong to say that I believe that the right-hand 
pedal of my car will make the car go faster and that the middle pedal will slow it down. 
Such a description is wrong because as an experienced and competent driver I do not 
need to think about which pedal to push when driving. When moving away from traffic 
lights, for example, rather than thinking to myself, 'to accelerate, push the right pedal', I 
simply push the appropriate pedal. 
The differe-Qce here, between my knowledge of the nearest newspaper shop and 
my knowledge concerning the operation of the pedals in my car, is that, while knowledge 
of both sorts clearly plays a role in my actions, I do not hold a specific intentional 
hypothesis to the effect that the right-hand pedal is the accelerator and the middle pedal is 
the brake. That is, this second sort of knowledge is non-intentional. 
The point, then, is that in addition to the Network of intentional states that 
contains so much of what we know about the world, Searle argues that we possess vaIious 
skills, abilities, tendencies and dispositions that also embody knowledge about the world 
without being intrinsically intentional. It is this set of non-intentional capacities of the 
mind that Searle calls the Background. Consider again the sense in which I know how to 
7 So. starting with my intention to buy a newspaper, we found that my knowledge of the nearest shop and 
my preference for driving rather than walking caused me to drive to a particular shop. But what states were 
implicated in my driving? Well, my knowing that my car is parked next to the house, my knowledge of the 
local geography, knowing how to drive, and so on. But then consider the functioning of each of these: for 
example, what was implicated in my knowing how to drive? 
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or not the Network is self-interpreting in the following sense: if we follow out each strand 
of the Network, identifying at each step what determines the conditions of satisfaction of 
the intentional state concerned7, will a point be reached such that all conditions of 
satisfaction have been fully determined? Aside from possible technical difficulties 
presented by the fact that at any given time most of our intentional states are unconscious 
and that it may be difficult to individuate states , Searle argues that such a point will not be 
reached. 
Instead, as we move out through the Network listing the things that are implicated 
in the determination of our intentional states ' conditions of satisfaction, we shall reach a 
point where what we are listing seems too fundamental to be considered as yet more 
intentional states. For example, while it seems to make sense to say that I have a belief 
about the location of the nearest shop that sells newspapers and a preference for The 
Daily Telegraph over The Times, it seems wrong to say that I believe that the tight-hand 
pedal of my car will make the car go faster and that the middle pedal will slow it down. 
Such a description is wrong because as an experienced and competent driver I do not 
need to think about which pedal to push when driving. When moving away from traffic 
lights, for example, rather than thinking to myself, ' to accelerate, push the right pedal', I 
simply push the appropriate pedal. 
The differe,nce here, between my knowledge of the nearest newspaper shop and 
my knowledge concerning the operation of the pedals in my car, is that, while knowledge 
of both .sorts clearly plays a role in my actions, I do not hold a specific intentional 
hypothesis to the effect that the right-hand pedal is the accelerator and the middle pedal is 
the brake. That is , this second sort of knowledge is non-intentional. 
The point, then, is that in addition to the Network of intentional states that 
contains so much of what we know about the world, Searle argues that we possess various 
skills, abilities , tendencies and dispositions that also embody knowledge about the world 
without being intrinsically intentional. It is this set of non-intentional capacities of the 
mind that Searle calls the Background. Consider again the sense in which I know how to 
7 So , starting with my intention to buy a newspaper, we found that my knowledge of the nearest shop and 
my preference for driving rather than walking caused me to drive to a particular shop. But what states were 
implicated in my driving? Well , my kno wing that my car is parked next to the house, my knowledge of the 
local geography, knowing how to drive, and so on . But then consider the functioning of each of these: for 
example, what was implicated in my knowing ho w to drive? 
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use the pedals in my car. According to this thesis of the Background, I have developed 
some sort of capacity, located in the · brain, which enables me to drive. This ability to 
dlive means that I can coordinate my use of the pedals, the gears, the indicators and so on, 
without ~aving to think about what each of them does and how to operate them. It is a 
simple fact that I have this capacity. Notice that this ability contains my knowledge about 
what each pedal does - when I dlive this ability manifests this knowledge - but it does so 
without my holding a particular belief, a particular conscious representation, that contains 
this knowledge. 
In Intentionality , Searle supports the idea of the Background with arguments that 
consider three different areas of human behaviour: our understanding of the literal 
meaning of sentences, our use of metaphor and our ability to acquire physical skills. With 
each, the intention is to show that an explanation of the behaviour concemed requires a 
Background of non-intentional capacities. Consider in particular the first and third of 
these arguments. The first deals with the way in which we understand the literal meaning 
of sentences. Searle (1983: 145) asks us to consider the following sentences: 
Tom opened the door. 
Sam opened his book to page 37 . 
The surgeon opened the wound. 
" 
In each case there seems to be little scope for misunderstanding what the sentence 
means. That is, faced with explaining the meaning of any of the sentences, I would 
confidently predict a high degree of uniformity among the answers of any sample of the 
population . Now notice the general form of these sentences: each adheres to the pattem 
'X opened Y' where the literal meaning of the word 'open' is the same in each case8• But 
while the literal meaning of 'open ' - and so the semantic content it provides to each 
sentence - is identical across sentences , the way that that semantic content is understood 
clearly differs in each case. What constitutes opening a wound is not the same as what 
constitutes opening a door; our understanding of the word 'open ' is context dependent. 
So how do we cOITectly understand what it means to 'open' in each of these 
sentences? What matters is how our · knowledge of the context enables the con'ect 
8 Since otherwise the meaning of the word 'open' is indefinitely ambiguous . See 'Literal Meaning' in 
Searle (1979). 
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interpretation. In the above examples it seems fairly clear that the relevant know-how is 
non-intentionalistic since, rather than thinking about the nature of doors, books and 
wounds we immediately know what it is to open the object concerned. But if books were 
unfamiliqr objects, perhaps being something we had been told about but were not used to 
dealing with, it would be intentional knowledge that enabled our understanding of the 
phrase 'opened the book'. We would reflect on our knowledge of books and then interpret 
the sentence accordingly. Notice though that even in this case there must still be a 
Background. If our understanding of a sentence relies on other intentional knowledge, 
then our understanding of the semantic content of this additional knowledge ultimately 
requires the non-intentional know-how contained in the Background. 
Now consider another area of human behaviour, the nature of physical skills such 
as being able to drive or play a particular sport well. Using a favoUlite example of his, the 
ability to ski, Searle contrasts the experience of the learner skier with the expelt. The 
beginner receives a series of verbal and visual instructions telling him how to ski. These 
instructions rely on representations, which is to say that when he skis these instructions 
are part of the intentional content that determines his behaviour: he tries to keep his knees 
bent, thinks about putting his weight on the downslope ski and so on. As such, the 
instructions and the skier's behaviour are a case of intentional causation, with the 
instructions having §: word-to-world direction of causation. Contrast this with the expert 
or 'skilled' skier, who skies without thinking about the instructions he once learnt. What 
from the point of view of mental functioning, asks Searle, distinguishes the two cases? 
The cognitivist answer9, Searle tells us, would be to suppose that whereas the 
beginner is conscious of the instructions while he skies, the expert has managed to 
'internalise' the instructions, such that they now function unconsciously. This idea of the 
unconscious functioning of intentional content seems to be what Lawson has in mind in 
E&R'o. In commenting on the fact that people first acquire their knowledge of the rules of 
9 See, for example, Polanyi ' s (1958) conception of tacit knowledge, Chomsky (1975) on the unconscious 
following of the rules of Universal Grammar and Fodor (1975) on our unconscious knowledge of the 
language of thought. 
10 If Lawson ' s position on tacit knowledge is something other than cognitivist, that is, if the meaning of 
'internalised' is not the unconscious functioning of intentional content, then my criticism is that this 
alternative position is left unexplained. In either case, Searle's notion of intentionality is offered as the key 
to understanding the difference between the functioning of discursive and tacit knowledge. One phrase in 
particular invites a non-cognitivist reading of Lawson's notion of tacit knowledge. Having suggested that 
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languages, games, social situations and so on, discursively (that is, intentionalistically), 
and that over time this knowledge becomes tacit, Lawson (1997: 178) proposes that the 
rules become internalised: 
even where social rules are tacitly held many of them were once discursively 
acquired, people are initially taught rules [of languages, games etc.] . .. even if, with 
time, such rules become internalised and, temporarily at least, forgotten from 
discursive consciousness, being only tacitly known . 
Searle gives a different answer. Rather than the expert skier being someone who 
has managed to internalise the instructions and who can now interpret them without 
explicit thought, Searle suggests that for the expert, the instructions are no longer a factor: 
'repeated experiences create physical capacities, presumably realised as neural pathways, 
that make the rules simply irrelevant' (SearJe 1983: 150). Which is the more plausible, he 
asks : that each physical skill is underlain by a number of unconscious mental 
representations or that 'practice and training in a variety of situations eventually makes 
the causal functioning of representation unnecessary in the exercise of the skill' (Searle 
1983: 151)? If it is the latter, then it is the distinction between intentional (Network) and 
non-intentional (Background) knowledge that explains what Lawson refers to as tacit 
"-
knowledge, rather than the consciousness or unconsciousness of given intentional 
contents . 
. These two arguments , concerning our capacity for understanding literal meaning 
and the acquisition of physical skills , provide strong support for our conceiving of the 
tacit realm along the lines of the Background, as Searle argues we should. Searle's 
strategy in putting forward these considerations is not to show either formally or 
decisively that his position is the conect one. Rather, he is concerned to show that, given 
the Background as a working hypothesis, evidence for the idea 'piles up everywhere' 
(Searle 1983: 152). It is noteworthy therefore that Searle suggests an alternative argument 
that represents a more formal 'proof' of the existence of the Background. 
social rules may be represented in terms of an injunction of the form ' if x do y under conditions z', he 
writes, '1 have not suggested that agents acting on social rules typically represent them in this manner or 
indeed hold any explicit representation at all ' (Lawson 1997: 172). We are then referred to chapter 13 , in 
which Lawson develops the account of tacit knowledge 1 reviewed in section two of this essay, taking us no 
further than the notion of internali sed knowledge . 
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The argument begins by supposing that all cognitive capacities are intentional; 
that is, that the opposite of what would be the case if the Background thesis is true. In this 
situation, mental processes would consist in moving from one semantic content to the 
next, calculating conditions of satisfaction and then acting. The problem with this picture 
is that semantic contents are never fully self-interpreting, that is, we have to know how to 
apply them, and that knowledge cannot consist of further representations without infinite 
regress. Take the example of a person's ability to walk (Searle 1983: 152). If this ability 
consists of various representations, a set of internalised rules for walking, we would have 
various rules such as 'first, move the left foot forward, then the right foot, then the left' 
and so on. As we saw earlier, however, our interpretation of such a rule is not fully 
determined by its semantic content: what exactly counts as a 'foot', as 'movement', as 
'forward'? If the correct interpretation is fixed by further representations, then the 
problem will recur at the next step because these additional representations will require 
interpretation . The only way out, argues Searle, is to recognise that at some point 'we just 
act' . 
In the case of walking, we do not need rules . We just have the ability to walk. In 
the cases where we do act according to rules, where rules function intentionalistically in 
our behaviour, we do not need any further rules for interpreting these rules. In this way, 
the Background o(,non-intentionalistic capacities grounds our intentionalistic mental life, 
preventing the possibility of circularity and infinite regress in our original conception of 
intentionality and intentional causation. 
The Background and Social Rules 
Having established the Background as : 
1) functionally equivalent to the capacity for tacit knowledge possessed by the human 
subject in E&R, in the sense of it enabling the functioning of knowledge in behaviour 
without that knowledge being ' thought about'; and, 
2) conceptually preferable to Lawson's account of tacit knowledge, since the notion of 
intentionality provides the missing element in his discussion of discursive and tacit 
knowledge, 
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we can now apply the idea of the Background to an individual's knowledge of social 
rules. The idea that much of what we know about society's structures is located in the 
Background is not without precedent. In The Construction of Social Reality (Searle 1995), 
Searle himself sets out a theory of social ontology which incorporates the Background as 
the means by which we are largely unaware of the nature of the institutions within which 
we act. The central point about such Background knowledge will by now be familiar: it is 
that 'one can develop, one can evolve, a set of abilities that are causally sensitive to 
specific structures of intentionality without actually being constituted by that 
intentionality ' (Searle 1995: 142). 
Consider the institution of money as it exists in the UK. We may think of the 
existence of notes and coins that possess the power to function as a means of exchange in 
terms of various rules: for example, 'notes and coins with a certain physical structure 
count as Sterling', 'Sterling is accepted in exchange for goods and services in the UK' 
and so on. While it is clear that our behaviour is sensitive to these rules - we possess 
knowledge of them - it also seems clear that when we use money we do not think about 
the rules that govern its use. According to the Background hypothesis , rather than either 
consciously or unconsciously following the rules, the explanation (Searle 1995: 142) of 
people's behaviour is that they 
have developed a set of dispositions that are sensitive and responsive to the 
specific content of those rules ... they must have the ability to use money as a medium 
of exchange, and they have to be responsive to the distinction between counterfeit 
money and real money, even though they might not be able to tell the difference 
without expert help. Their behaviour has to be responsive to the fact that currency is 
valuable not because of the paper it is printed on but because it functions as a 
medium of exchange .. . those sorts of abilities, this type of know-how, that become 
ingrained are in fact a reflection of the sets of constitutive rules . 
Such 'Background Causation' therefore involves a type of explanatory inversion 
away from the cognitivist conception of unconscious intentional causation. Rather than 
saying that a person behaves the way he does because he is following the rules of an 
institution , we should say that at the causal level , the person behaves that way because his 
Background disposes him towards behaving that way; at the functional level he has come 
to be disposed that way because that is the way that conforms to the rules of the 
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institution . In other words, the causal structures of the Background explain the behaviour 
and the structures are explained by the system of rules, but the Background need not itself 
be a system of rules. 
V CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the conception of tacit knowledge employed by Tony Lawson in E&R 
is inadequate in that it fails to account for the difference between knowledge that 
functions in behaviour by virtue of being thought about and knowledge that functions 
without being thought about. The notion of knowledge being ' internalised' is question 
begging, since we are not provided with an explanation of how such internalised 
knowledge differs from cUlTently unconscious, but discursively-functioning, knowledge. 
The notions of intentionality, intentional causation and the Background, provide us with 
an answer: those neurobiological features of the brain that correspond to intentional 
mental states explain the discursive functioning of knowledge, while non-intentional 
brain structures account for our capacity for tacit knowledge. 
THE HUMAN AGENT IN BEHA VIOURAL FINANCE: A SEARLEAN 
PERSPECTIVE l 
I INTRODUCTION 
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One of the main themes in John Searle's philosophy of mind is that the mental input into 
rational behaviour consists of more than our conscious, reflected upon, reasons for acting. 
In addition there are Background states, predispositions, skills and capacities that function 
causally but non-consciously. As Runde (2002) argues, the dominant conception of 
rational agency in economics, expected utility theory, ignores the existence and 
importance of the Background. For expected utility theory, behaviour is all about 
preferences and beliefs2• In this paper I examine the Searlean credentials of a second 
conception of agency found in economics, that associated with the literature on 
behavioural finance. 
The model of the economic agent assumed in behavioural finance, call him BFA, 
makes for an interesting object of study for at least two reasons. The first comes from the 
fact that the field of behavioural finance is concerned with the impact of various 
psychological influ~nces on human behaviour in financial markets. As a consequence its 
conception of human agency is an explicitly descriptive one, informed by psychologist's 
research .into how people actually form judgments and take decisions. While 
unquestionably rational in the sense that his actions are caused by reasons, the BFA is 
also influenced by factors that are less obviously to do with reason and conscious 
I This paper has been published in the Spring 2002 edition of the Journal of Economic Methodology 
(Faulkner 2002a). My thanks to lochen Runde, Tony Lawson, Clive Lawson, Leon Montes and Steve 
Pratten for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
2 Despite the apparently clear ontology (based on beliefs , states of the world and preferences) associated 
with expected utility theory (on which, see section V of my third essay), alternative interpretations of utility 
maximisation (e .g., Chipman et al. 1971; Friedman 1953; Machlup 1946; Samuelson 1937, 1938, 1947, 
1948) that emphasise consistency of behaviour or the evolutionary benefits of utility maximisartion suggest 
that beliefs and preferences are not essential to rational choice conceptions of action. See Ross and Nisbett 
(1991) for a review of the evidence on behavioral consistency; Sen (1993) for criticisms of the 
'consistency' view; and Winter (1964) and Hodgson (1994) for problems with the evolutionary 
47 
reflection. It seems natural to enqUIre whether some of these factors are Searlean 
Background states. The second reason for studying the BFA is the present prominence of 
the field of behavioural finance. Since its emergence in the mid-1980s in the work of 
economists such as Shiller, Summers and Thaler, behavioural finance has seen a surge in 
research output over the past decade3 . 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I set out Searle's account of 
rational human behaviour, central to which is his theory of intentional mental states 
(mental states that are intrinsically about, or directed towards, something or someone) and 
the non-intentional Background. Section three discusses some aspects of human agency 
emphasised in the behavioural finance literature. I characterise these as traits falling into 
three categories: prospect theory, heuristic-based judgment and mental accounting. 
Section four examines the BFA from a Searlean point of view. I find that each of the three 
categOlies of traits seems to involve both conscious and non-conscious elements, 
consistent with the Searlean account of rational behaviour. I conclude with some 
comments on my findings. 
11 THE SEARLEAN AGENT: RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE BACKGROUND 
From the point of view of its rational decision-making, two propositions lie at the heart of 
Searle's conception of human agencl: 
• Where behaviour is rational, actions are caused by reasons. These reasons are 
intentional mental states that function in the discursive, reflected upon, conscious 
mind. 
interpretation. Steedman (1989, 2000) and Hodgson (1988) argue that mainstream accounts have a strong 
implicit attachment to an intentionalistic ontology. 
3 See Shefrin (2000) for a recent account. 
4 This section draws on Searle's work on intentionality (Searle 1983), consciousness (Searle 1994a) and 
social ontology (Searle 1995, 1999). 
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• When intentional mental states function causally, they always do so in association 
with non-intentional , Background capacities and dispositions that function in the 
non-conscious, non-reflected upon, mind. 
In this section I briefly expand on these two propositions. This requires a number of 
definitions, the first of which concerns the notion of a mental state. According to Searle, a 
brain state is only a mental state if it is ' ... in principle capable of causing that state in a 
conscious form' (SearJe 1999: 86). The key point about this definition is that it enables a 
distinction to be drawn between unconscious mental states (such as my presently 
unconscious, but often conscious, belief that marriages are time-consuming events to 
organise) and non-conscious, non-mental, brain states (such as the secretion of enzymes 
in the brain). This distinction, for Searle, turns on accessibility to consciousness. The 
second important definition concerns intentionality. An intentional mental state is a 
mental state that is intrinsically about, or directed towards, something or someone. 
Beliefs, for example, have this intrinsic 'aboutness' property, since to have a belief one 
must believe such and such a thing to be the case. The same is true of wants, needs, 
desires, memories and so on. 
While Searle recognises the existence of non-intentional mental states, such as a 
conscious feeling of undirected optimism or anxiety, he rules out the possibility that non-
mental brain states may be intentional. This latter possibility is eliminated as a result of a 
set of arguments he collectively terms the connection principle (Searle 1994a, 1994b), the 
essence of which is that intentionality assumes accessibility to consciousness which in 
turn implies that the state be mental. The most important set of non-intentional, non-
mental , brain states for our purposes are the contents of what Searle calls the Background, 
to which I return below. 
With these definitions out of the way, I can return to my two initial propositions. 
The first deals with Searle's understanding of rational behaviour. Searle considers 
behaviour to be rational where it 'functions on the basis of reasons' (Searle 1999: 106), 
and where the relationship between these reasons and the behaviour they cause 'is both 
logical and causal' (ibid.). By requiring a logical relationship between a reason and the 
action it causes, Searle defines as rational only those actions that were meant to occur on 
the basis of the reasons held. So for example, if because of my desire to maximise my 
wealth and my belief that stock markets offer the best combination of risk and return I 
1 
I 
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decide to invest In stocks, my subsequent purchase of a stock portfolio would be 
considered rational. 
The identification of rational behaviour with reasons that not only cause, but were 
intended to cause, the subsequent behaviour, suggests that the causal functioning of these 
reasons must involve the conscious mind. Reasons function causally because they are 
thought about, reflected upon and scrutinised as part of the decision-making process. 
Searle recognises this by identifying the reasons that cause rational behaviour with 
intentional mental states, such as the beliefs and desires that caused me to invest in stock. 
His theory of intentional causation then formalises the notion of reasons being logically 
as well as causally related to the subsequent behaviour. 
According to intentional causation, when an intentional mental state is the reason 
for an action, that state functions as the cause of the action by generating a conscious 
representation of the effect that it causes. Suppose in the above example that I form the 
intention to purchase a portfolio of stocks and that this intention is the reason for my 
subsequent behaviour. Intentions are themselves intentional mental states and according 
to intentional causation, when the intention caused my behaviour it did so by sustaining a 
conscious representation of my fulfilling that intention. But this is precisely the point to 
identifying the intention as the reason for my behaviour: I possessed the intention, I 
reflected upon what, it meant I should do, I acted. Rational behaviour, to summarise the 
point, involves intentional mental states that generate conscious thoughts in the process of 
functioning causally. 
The second proposition relates to the role of non-intentional, Background, states 
in rational behaviour. Searle ' s argument here is essentially a logical one that proceeds 
from the idea of intentional causation. According to intentional causation, an intentional 
mental state functions causally by virtue of being consciously scrutinised and its 
'condition of satisfaction' determined. The conditions of satisfaction of a mental state 
define what needs to be the case for an intention to be fulfilled, a belief to be true, a desire 
to be sated, and so on. Intentional states rarely function in isolation, in the sense that the 
determination of the conditions of satisfaction of anyone state typically relies on the 
contents (and so the determination of the conditions of satisfaction) of many other 
intentional states. 
Searle's point IS that this process of intentional causation, the conscious 
determination of conditions of satisfaction, could not and does not continue without end. 
At some point, rather than another set of conditions of satisfaction being consciously 
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determined, the Background takes over. Having earlier defined the Background to be a set 
of non-intentional, non-mental, brain states, I can now introduce them in more detail. 
Being non-intentional, when Background states function causally they do so non-
consciou.sly. What this means is that in contrast to thinking through the contents of 
another intentional state, the Background taking over marks the stage at which things are 
simply accepted or taken for granted without further conscious enquiry. 
Perhaps the most effective demonstration of Background states and their 
functioning is provided by the following example (Searle 1983: 145). Searle asks how we 
understand the following sentences: 
Tom opened the door. 
Sam opened his book to page 37. 
The surgeon opened the wound. 
The general form of each sentence is the same: each conforms to the pattern 'X 
opened Y', with the literal meaning of the word 'open' being the same in each case. 
However what it is to open each thing clearly differs; that is, the X and Y terms partly 
determine our understanding of each sentence. Now how do we achieve this? Do we 
reflect on the nature of each term, in the manner of intentional causation, determining a 
seIies of conditions of satisfaction? For these examples I suspect not. We understand each 
sentence without any conscious reflection of this sort; that is, the Background takes over 
straight away, in this case enabling our understanding through its non-conscious causal 
functioning. This needn't have been the case. Had one of the terms been unfamiliar, had 
we had to think about what it is for a surgeon to open a wound, then one or more rounds 
of conscious, intentional , reflection would have been necessary. Even in such a case 
though, the Background would have taken over at some point. 
Finally then, just what are these Background states? Searle views them as the 
various skills, capacities, abilities and dispositions we acquire that function without 
conscious reflection or deliberation. He cites the Background, for example, as the location 
of much of our knowledge of the rules that constitute society (Searle 1995). More 
generally, the Background contains our know-how about the most familiar, most 
frequently encountered, aspects of the world. 
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III THE HUMAN AGENT IN BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 
I turn now to the conception of the human agent in behavioural finance. Although the 
literature here draws on a wide range of findings from psychology, three types of traits 
represent the most prominent characteristics of the BFA. These relate either to prospect 
theory, heUIistic-based judgement or mental accounting. 
Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, 1984, 1992) prospect theory conception of Iisky choice 
is central to behavioural finance and its associated conception of human agency. In 
common with expected utility theory, prospect theory adopts a consequentialist approach 
to choice, which is to say that in making decisions, people are assumed to be concerned 
with the likely outcomes of their actions. In particular, they evaluate possible courses of 
action based on i) the desirability, and ii) the likelihood, of each action's possible 
outcomes. Where prospect theory differs from expected utility theory is in its explicit 
incorporation of certain weIl-established psychological traits5. 
Kahneman and Tversky break down the decision-making process into two phases, 
an initial editing ph~se, foIlowed by the evaluation phase. The editing phase involves a 
number of cognitive operations that transform the outcomes and probabilities associated 
with an action into a representation that then enters the evaluation phase. Among the most 
prominent editing operations are the foIlowing: 
• The coding of outcomes into gains and losses. 
• The simplification of prospects . 
• The detection of dominance. 
• The cancellation of common components. 
The first operation represents one of the most important characteristics of the 
decision-maker under prospect theory: that outcomes are perceived in telms of gains and 
losses relative to some reference point. The reference point might be the status quo, such 
5 In addition to the sources referred to in the text, Camerer (1995) provides an excellent survey of the 
literature on the evidence for the psychological traits incorporated into the BFA. 
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that the gains and losses associated with a simple lottery coincide with the actual amounts 
that can be won or lost. Alternatively, the reference point may come from the framing of 
the problem (see below) or be suggested by the expectations or history of the decision-
maker (the _purchase price of a share, for example). In such a situation, the gains and 
losses associated with a lottery need not correspond to the actual amounts won or lost. 
The remaining editing operations allow for other commonly observed traits. The 
simplification of prospects refers to the rounding of probabilities and outcomes, one 
effect of which can be to discard extremely unlikely events at this stage of the decision. 
Where dominance can easily be detected, dominated choices also tend to be discarded 
before the evaluation phase. The cancellation of components that are common to two or 
more prospects reflects a tendency for decision-makers to ignore the impact of shared, 
equally likely, outcomes in choosing between alternatives. 
In the subsequent evaluation phase, each of the edited prospects is then valued. 
The overall value of a prospect depends on two scales: 
• The subjective value, v(x), associated with each possible outcome, where x is the 
gain or loss relative to the reference point. 
• The decision weight, n(p) , associated with each possible outcome, where p is the 
probability of that outcome. 
The first scale, the value function, has the following properties: 
• Defined over gains and losses rather than final wealth. 
• Concave over gains and convex over losses. 
• Displays loss aversion. 
Each property relates to a basic principle of human perception or judgement. By defining 
the value function over gains and losses , Kahneman and Tversky incorporate the finding 
that changes rather than end states tend to be the can'iers of value. The curvature 
assumption reflects diminishing sensitivity over both gains and losses. This means that 
the difference in value between a gain of £10 and a gain of £20 is greater than the 
difference in value between a gain of £1 ,000 and a gain of£l,01O. 
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The third property, loss aversion, captures the fact that people tend to feel the pain 
associated with the loss of a given amount more than they would enjoy a similar sized 
gain. That is: 
-V(-X) Z AV(X) 
where the loss aversion parameter, A, is typically found to be in the order of two for small 
and medium-sized gambles (see Kahneman and Tversky (1992), for example, who fit 
prospect theory preferences to a sample of twenty five students using fictional lotteries 
that have prizes in the hundreds of dollars range) . 
The second scale, the weighting function, captures the effect that the likelihood of an 
outcome has on that outcome's contribution to the value of a prospect. As with the value 
function, the properties of the weighting function cOlTespond to prominent judgmental 
and perceptual traits: 
• Boundary effects: at either end of the probability scale, changes in probability are 
overweighted relati ve to changes in the middle of the scale. This means that the 
effect on the value of a lottery of a move from zero probability to positive 
probability, or from positive probability to certainty, is greater than the effect of a 
similar sized increase in probability that takes place away from either endpoint. 
• The weighting function is unstable for low probability events, such that these 
events tend either to be overweighted or ignored. 
• Away from the endpoints, decision weights are regressive with respect to 
probability. 
Having sketched its main features, I now want to highlight three important implications of 
the prospect theory conception of decision-making. The first concems the attitude to risk 
taking of the decision-maker under prospect theory. There are two points of note here. 
First of all, the curvature of the value function implies that the prospect theory decision-
maker is risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses. Secondly, with gains and 
losses being defined relati ve to a reference point and the reference point not being fixed 
for any given lottery, the risk attitudes of the prospect theory decision-maker are sensitive 
to context. To take one example, an investor's attitude to a share price rise depends on 
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whether the lise equates to a larger capital gain or a smaller capital loss; that is, whether 
he is risk averse or risk loving depends on the price at which the share was purchased. 
Second, loss aversion plays a major role in behavioural finance, as demonstrated 
by the ten.dency (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Shefrin 2000) for investors to keep their loss 
making positions open for longer than the objective of maximising returns would suggest. 
Prospect theory tells us that investors will tend to focus on gains and losses when they 
make decisions. In editing these gains and losses the price at which the asset was 
purchased represents a natural reference point. Loss aversion means that the pain 
associated with a loss is felt much more than the pleasure associated with an equivalent 
gain. But investors do not suffer a loss until they sell their holding. Consequently, when 
faced with deciding which share in their portfolio to sell (whatever the reason for selling), 
loss aversion causes investors to sell their profitable positions before their losing positions 
in spite of the outlook for these shares. Indeed, as Odean (1998) and Heisler (1994) show, 
the 'winners' that get sold tend to subsequently outpetfOIm the 'losers' that are kept. 
The final phenomenon that follows directly from prospect theory concerns the 
sensitivity of preferences to the framing of decision problems. The following example 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1984) demonstrates the effect: 
1. An outbreak of a disease is expected to kill 600 people. Scientists propose two 
possible programs: 
Program A, according to which they estimate that 200 people will survive, or 
Program B, according to which they estimate that the probability that all 600 
people will survive is 1/3 and the probability that none will survive is 2/3. 
Kahneman and Tversky report that the majority of respondents choose program A. Such a 
response is typical of, and consistent with, prospect theory . Since the implied reference 
point for this problem is the loss of 600 people, the two programs deal with gains. 
According to prospect theory, people tend to be risk averse over gains, consistent with the 
majority favouring program A. 
Now consider the same scenmio presented in a different frame: 
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2. An outbreak of a disease IS expected to kill 600 people. Scientists propose two 
possible programs: 
Program C, according to which they estimate that 400 people will die, or 
Program D, according to which they estimate there the probability of nobody 
dying is 1/3 and the probability that all 600 people will die is 2/3. 
Faced with this problem, Kahneman and Tversky report that a majority now favour 
program D although the underlying scenmio - the outbreak and the possible programs - is 
identical. So why does changing the frame lead to a change in preferences? The 
difference between the two problems is the implied reference point used for the 
calculation of gains and losses. In problem two the implicit reference point is zero deaths. 
The outcomes are therefore evaluated as losses. Prospect theory tells us to expect risk-
seeking behaviour over losses, which is the observed result in this problem. Therefore the 
framing effect - the switch in preferences between two identical programs - is jointly 
caused by 'topical' (gains and losses) rather than 'comprehensive' editing and evaluation 
on the part of the decision maker and a frame that suggests a different reference point for 
each problem. 
Heuristic-Based Judgement 
Whereas prospect theory provides an account of the editing and evaluation of lotteries 
that are defined in terms of given outcomes and probabilities, the second set of traits 
relating to the BFA concern the way that people alTive at their beliefs about possible 
outcomes and their probabilities. People are found to rely on a variety of heuristics, or 
rules of thumb, in forming their judgements, the classic reference here being the 
collection of papers in Kahneman et al. (1982) . Heuristics are like back-of-the-envelope 
calculations, reducing the amount of cqmputation to be performed while providing a 
reasonable estimate of the required probability or quantity. Their interest to behavioural 
finance derives from the various systematic violations of the rules of probability that they 
introduce into people's judgements. Computational manageability, it seems, comes at the 
cost of bias. I will discuss three prominent heuristics in behavioural finance: 
representativeness, availability and anchoring-and-adjustment. 
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The representativeness heuristic, famously used by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) to 
explain their winner-loser effect, refers to people's reliance on similarity or 
representativeness when judging the likelihood that an event or object A belongs to class 
or process B. An investor, for example, may have to assess the likelihood that a company 
(A) has a profitable future (B) or not; or decide whether or not an innovative new product 
will prove commercially viable. According to representativeness, a common way for 
people to make such judgements is to rely on the degree to which A resembles the 
stereotypical B. When A is highly representative of B, the assessed probability is high; 
when A appears unrepresentative of B, the assessed probability is low. 
The rationale for basing a probability judgement on representativeness comes 
from the fact that the stereotype captures some of the information on which a correct 
assessment of likelihood should be based. Yet to the extent that representativeness does 
govern judgement, certain types of bias are inevitable. Firstly, representativeness is 
independent of factors such as prior probabilities, sample size and predictability, which 
while relevant to the probability of A being an instance B, do not influence the 
resemblance of A to the stereotypical B. 
Secondl y, the representati veness heuristic sustains certain misconceptions about 
the nature of probabilistic events. For instance, people tend to believe that a sequence of 
events generated by ~ random process will be representative of the key characteristics of 
that random process, even over short sequences. Such an expectation is mistaken. 
Sequences .of ten coin tosses, for example, will contain many more runs of consecutive 
heads or tails than representativeness would lead one to expect. A belief in such 'local 
representativeness ' also sustains the 'gambler's fallacy', the mistaken belief that after a 
run of heads , a tail is 'due' on the next toss. 
A second important heuristic in the behavioural finance literature is the 
availability heUlistic, according to which people tend to assess the frequency of a class, or 
the probability of an event, by the ease with which instances of that class or event can be 
brought to mind. For example, the risk of death from a particular disease, or the 
likelihood of a given business venture collapsing, is judged on the basis of how many 
fatal OCCUlTences of that disease can be recollected, or how many different failure 
scenarios can be imagined. The value of the heuristic comes from the fact that instances 
of larger classes or more likely events tend to be more easily recalled than instances of 
smaller classes, and that likely events are more easily imagined than unlikely events. Yet, 
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as with representativeness, the tendency to rely on availability leads to certain systematic 
biases in judgement, since factors other than frequency and probability affect availability. 
Most obviously, the retrievability of instances also depends on factors such as 
familiarity. salience and experience. Two classes may be of equal size, but if the instances 
of one class are more familiar (due to press coverage, personal experience, and so on) 
than that class will be judged the larger. A second source of bias stems from the need to 
imagine, rather than remember, the instances of some types of classes. These frequency 
judgements will then depend on the ease with which relevant instances can be 
constructed, which need not be well correlated with actual frequency. 
The final heuristic device, known as 'anchoring and adjustment', occurs when 
people's judgements are anchored to a particular value. When new infonnation arises 
from which to re-evaluate a judgement, the adjustment process is typically insufficient 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971). This 'conservatism' leads to judgements that are biased 
towards the anchor and as a consequence the source of this initial value becomes 
significant. The sort of bias that anchoring can introduce into judgement is discussed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974). They demonstrate, for example, the tendency for people 
to anchor their estimates of uncertain quantities to unrelated, but salient, values. They also 
show that the conservatism of the adjustment process leads to systematic over- and under-
estimation of the likeUhood of certain types of compound events. Shefrin (2000) uses the 
notion of conservatism to explain why earnings surprises tend to be positively serially 
con'elated. Analysts and investors tend to underweight the latest earnings infonnation in 
their earnings forecasts . This under-adjustment means that continued strong or poor 
pelfonnance is then under-anticipated. 
Shiller (2000) looks at the role that anchors play in the day-to-day movement of 
stock prices. Noting that prices tend to be stable over relatively long peliods but liable to 
sudden shifts, he distinguishes two types of anchor: 
• Quantitative anchors , which indicate the 'appropriate' level of the market. 
• Moral anchors, which detelmine the strength of reason for buying stocks. 
Each type of anchor functions differently. With quantitative anchors, investors 
weigh numbers against prices in order to judge whether or not a stock is worth buying. 
The most likely anchors for individual stocks are salient plice levels; for example, the 
- , 
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most recently remembered p11ce or a notable price from the past, such as a recent high or 
low. Anchoring may also be to price changes or price-earnings ratios. 
While quantitative anchors are particular values, moral anchors are the stories and 
reasons that people have for holding their financial assets relative to other possible uses of 
their wealth. The 'intuitive force' or strength of these stories relative to how much of their 
wealth is cUlTently invested in the market detelmines whether a person invests more or 
less. These anchors often have cultural or ethical roots. Shiller notes the association 
between holding stocks and being thought of as sensible or prudent, an anchor and motive 
for market behaviour that applies regardless of the CUlTent level of the market. 
Just as the stability of anchors goes some way to explaining the day-to-day 
stability of stock markets, their occasional fragility can be the cause of dramatic shifts in 
the market. Rather than continually assessing the validity of their anchors, people seem 
only to examine them in the face of exceptional events. This means that when anchors do 
change, they do so abruptly and well after the time it would, with hindsight, have made 
sense to adjust them. Perhaps something akin to this explains the nature of the 'dotcom' 
collapse in 2000. Despite the market rising and 11sing, the majority of people appear to 
have continued to believe the stories behind the hi-tech shares and remained invested, 
even when an examination of these companies' fundamentals would have shown their 
incredible valuations.; They were anchored to their 'dotcom' judgements. Only when the 
market stopped rising and began to fall could people begin to comprehend that their 
anchors were hopelessly out of date. 
Mental Accounting 
In addition to prospect theory and heuristic-based judgement, the third set of traits drawn 
on extensively by behavioural finance relate to mental accounting. Thaler defines mental 
accounting to be the 'set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to 
organise, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities' (Thaler 1999: 241). These 
operations matter because the rules that people adopt are not neutral with respect to 
decision-making. The assignment of a purchase to one account rather than another, or the 
decision to combine a number of outcomes within one category, or how often to 'balance 
the books', affects the decisions that people make. 
Thaler distinguishes three components of mental accounting. The first deals with 
the accounting of individual transactions, in particular the way that outcomes are 
59 
perceived and experienced, decisions made and subsequently evaluated. In this respect, 
the mental accounting literature aligns itself with the editing and evaluation phases of 
prospect theory. Having already discussed these in some detail, I want simply to highlight 
some of .the additional factors that mental accounting introduces into the editing phase. 
Consider the following decision problem: 
Choose one alternative from each situation: 
Situation 1: A: £2,400 gain with certainty, or 
B: £10,000 gain with probability 0.25, nothing with probability 
0.75 . 
Situation 2: C: £7,500 loss with certainty, or 
D: £10,000 loss with probability 0.75, nothing with probability 
0.25. 
The most common response (Thaler 1999) to this 'conculTent choice' problem is the pair 
(A, D), which is equivalent to the lottery (-£7,600, 0.75; £2,400, 0.25). Yet the pair (B, 
C), which is equivalent to the lottery (-£7,500, 0.75; £2,500, 0.25), strictly dominates (A, 
D). The reason most people choose the dominated pair appears to be the tendency to 
evaluate each element of the choice separately. Taken alone, options A and Dare 
consistent with the typical value function of a prospect theory decision-maker. 
The failure to conceive of these two situations as one choice, or rather the 
tendency to evaluate a choice in the terms that it is presented (in this case, as two separate 
decisions), is a common finding in the mental accounting literature. Thaler and lohnson 
(1991) demonstrate a number of similar effects caused by the framing of payoffs. They 
show, for example, that preferences depend on whether part of a payoff is framed as a 
previous gain or loss. They also find that people are more likely to gamble after a win, a 
result that is well illustrated by the tendency for gamblers to keep their winnings in a 
separate pocket and be far more risk seeking in their use of money from the 'winnings' 
pocket. 
The second component of mental accounting concerns the maintenance of mental 
accounts , or categOlies, and the assignment of activities to these accounts. Expenditures, 
wealth and income are all labelled in this way. The division of expenditures into different 
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accounts serves two maIn purposes. Firstly it enables 'rational' trade-offs to be made 
between competing uses for funds, at the level of types of spending rather than individual 
purchases. Secondly, it encourages self-control by allowing budgets to be operated for 
different types of consumption. Heath and Soli (1996) consider the mental processes 
involved in the maintenance of such consumption accounts. They propose a two-stage 
process; stage one involves expenses being noticed ('booked'), at stage two these 
expenses are then assigned to their correct accounts ('posted'). 
Wealth accounts also appear to serve as a self-control device, making certain 
funds less accessible than others. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) propose a hierarchy of wealth 
locations along these lines, arranged by how tempting it is for a household to spend the 
money in each. At the 'most easily spent ' end of the scale lies the 'cUlTent assets' 
category which consists of cash in hand and money in deposit accounts; this wealth is 
routinely spent every period. Next comes 'culTent wealth', which consists of assets such 
as stocks, bonds and funds, which are less tempting to spend and are nOlmally thought of 
as savings. Home equity comes next, followed finally by 'future income', which 
comprises future earnings and retirement savings. 
The plimary importance of this component of mental accounting to behaviour lies 
in the non-fungibility of money between different accounts. For expenditures this occurs 
when the budget for ODe category of consumption has been fully spent or recently drawn 
on. For wealth accounts Shefrin and Tha,ler estimate that the marginal propensity to spend 
a dollar of wealth in the current income account is near unity, while for wealth in the 
future income account this figure is close to zero. The 'mental location' of wealth 
therefore matters for consumption, in contrast to a simple life-cycle consumption model 
where the effect on consumption of a change in wealth ignores the type or source of this 
wealth. 
Income accounting also affects behaviour. O'CUlTY (1997) examines the effect on 
consumption of income from different categories, by distinguishing 'serious' from 
'frivolous' sources and uses of funds. She finds a tendency for people to match the 
seliousness of the source of a cash windfall with its use. Kooreman (1997) reports a 
similar finding, which is that the source of income partly determines how it is spent. 
Investors also appear to be affected by this phenomenon, apparently distinguishing 
between capital gains and dividends as types of income. Hatsopoulos et al. (1989), for 
example, report evidence of a 'mailbox' effect, according to which capital gains are spent 
much less readily than dividends, which tend to be spent as soon as they at'live. 
- - J 
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The final component of mental accounting concerns the closing of mental 
accounts. To illustrate this aspect, consider Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) observation 
that betting on long shots at horse races tends to increase for the last race of the day. Why 
might this be? Thaler (1999) notes that the average bettor enters the final race sitting on a 
loss and with the desire to break-even on the day. That is, the typical gambler opens a 
racing account for each days racing, and closes it after the final race. Faced with a loss 
coming into the final race, the average gambler places additional value on the longshot 
because it offers the greatest chance to break even on the day, and to therefore close the 
account in the black. 
While some situations offer a natural choice of 'bracket' for the mental account -
the race day for the gambler - most investment scenarios take place over a long period of 
time. This provides an individual with some discretion as to the choice of bracket and the 
peliod over which gains or losses are evaluated. A significant result in this light is that 
people who are loss averse are more willing to take risks if they can combine bets 
together rather than considering them one at a time; in other words, if they can take a 
long-term view of their investment decisions6 • This idea of 'myopic loss aversion' 
sustains Benartzi and Thaler's (1995) explanation of the equity premium puzzle (Mehra 
and Prescott 1985). 
IV A SEARLEAN PERSPECTIVE ON CONCEPTIONS OF AGENCY IN 
BEHA VIOURAL FINANCE 
While the move to incorporate aspects of human psychology into its conception of the 
human agent is the defining feature of behavioural finance, the literature is silent on what 
might be termed the 'Searlean dimension' to these traits, that is , on the role of 
consciousness in their operation. At the same time, it seems clear that a number of them 
relate to, or involve, non-conscious, Background dispositions as well as conscious, 
reflected upon, reasons and reasoning. In this section I develop the Searlean perspective. 
Let me begin by reiterating what Searle ' s analysis does and does not say. As 
discussed in section two, Searle proposes that we understand rational behaviour in terms 
6 See Thaler (1999) for a deri vation of this result. Experimental work (Gneezy and Potters 1997; Thaler et 
al. 1997) also supports the finding that longer time horizons induce greater risk taking. 
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of behaviour caused by conscious reasons that are aimed at blinging about certain actions. 
These reasons function intentionalistically but do so only in association with non-
intentional, Background 'know-how', which functions without being part of the 
discursive conscious. The force of Searle's position is therefore to show that wherever 
there is intentionality, it must ' bottom-out' in non-intentional Background states. What 
Searle's analysis does not do is dictate which traits are to be understood in either 
intentional or non-intentional teIms. This is a matter to be settled by an analysis of the 
traits themselves. 
Prospect Theory 
According to the Searlean definition, actions are rational where they are caused by 
reasons and where these reasons are both causally and logically related to the subsequent 
action. For Searle these reasons are intentional states that function in the conscious mind. 
Is the decision-maker under prospect theory rational in this Searlean sense? Reflection on 
the two stages of prospect theory suggests that he is, with the reasons of the prospect 
theory decision-maker functioning during the evaluation phase of the decision . In support 
of this, consider the conscious, reflected upon, processes involved in decision-making. 
The principle proces~es to consider relate to the subjective valuations of possible 
outcomes, the weighting of outcomes and the subsequent combining of these two scales 
into a valuation of each prospect. 
As an example, consider the process of valuing an outcome. Here the decision-
maker must reflect upon his likes and dislikes and infer from these the value of each 
possible outcome. The Searlean notions of determining conditions of satisfaction, of 
scrutinising the contents of our intentional states and of intentional causation seem 
appropriate here. The same can be said concerning the decision over how to weight and 
combine each possible outcome into a final valuation for each prospect. These refer to 
conscious, intentional, processes. In light of this, the key characteristics of the value and 
weighting functions (loss aversion , diminishing sensitivity, the overweighting of certain 
outcomes etc.) are to be thought of as prominent characteristics of human preferences, by 
which I mean that they are typical features of the intentional states that people possess. 
If the evaluation phase of prospect theory deals essentially with the intentionalistic 
aspects of behaviour, what can be said of the editing phase? Why is it, to take its most 
important aspect first , that people focus on gains and losses rather than comprehensive 
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outcomes when they take decisions? Reflecting on this tendency, it rarely seems to be the 
result of a conscious decision to edit outcomes in this way. Rather it is something that is 
typically done without reflection, a way of proceeding that we are simply predisposed 
towards. In support of this, consider the earlier framing effect. The observed difference in 
preferences betwe~n the two identical disease-control programs was understood in terms 
of people valuing changes, combined with a shift in reference point. It seems wrong to 
associate these effects with decision-makers' conscious deliberation. Rather, once the 
deliberative stage is reached, the editing has already occUlTed. 
It is interesting in this light that Kahneman and Tversky report the responses of 
the experimental subjects who faced this particular problem. When confronted with their 
conflicting answers, the subjects reported that they still wished to be risk averse in the 
'lives saved' version of the problem, risk seeking in the 'lives lost' version, but that they 
also wished to give consistent answers. Kahneman and Tversky conclude that 'in their 
stubborn appeal, framing effects resemble perceptual illusions more than computational 
en'ors' (Kahneman and Tversky 1984: 5). If their cause is a Background disposition 
towards evaluating changes relative to some reference point, then Kahneman and Tversky 
are right to reject the comparison to computational elTors, since these would seem to 
imply conscious rather than non-conscious cognitive processes. 
Although the teudency to focus on gains and losses is the most important of the 
prospect theory editing operations, the others discussed earlier - the detection of 
dominance, the simplification of prospects and the cancellation of common components -
may also suit a Background, rather than intentionalistic, interpretation. In ignoring 
obviously dominated or inferior alternatives, for example, it is clear that we need not be 
consciously deciding to disregard such options. Rather, the experienced actor may 
become predisposed towards ignoring them, leaving his intentionality to evaluate the 
alternatives that need to be decided between. I would argue that the same applies for the 
observed tendencies to round or simplify probabilities and outcomes and cancel common 
components; rather than discursively thinking about and implementing such operations, 
we find that some people simply have simplified and cancelled prior to the conscious 
evaluation process. 
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Heuristics 
In putting forward a Searlean interpretation of heuristic-based judgement, the first 
question to address would seem to be whether or not heUlistics function like rules, which 
people consdously apply in situations requiring a probability judgement. In principle 
heuristics certainly could take this form. For example, the representativeness heuristic 
could refer to a person who consciously reflects to himself, 'the way to calculate the 
likelihood that event A belongs to class B is to consider how closely A resembles my 
stereotype of B ' . 
In general , however, this does not seem to be what the idea of a heUlistic is getting 
at. Rather than consciously deciding to fOlm judgements on the basis of things such as 
availability or representativeness , it seems better to think of heUlistics as Background 
states that predispose us towards relying on these things as the basis of our probability 
judgements. This fits with Kahneman and Tversky's link between the operation of 
heuristics and the making of what they call 'intuitive judgements' (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1974: 18), by which they mean judgements that do not involve full conscious 
deliberation at each step. 
While heUlistics themselves may reside in the Background, this does not prevent 
certain intentional processes being involved in their operation. The availability heuristic, 
for example, relies on tlle intentional operations of retrieval, construction and recall. But 
this point simply emphasises the difference and interaction between the intentional and 
non-intentional levels of functioning . The decision-maker, faced first with the need to 
form a probability assessment, is guided by Background dispositions to focus on 
availability. This occurs unthinkingly. What takes place in the conscious mind is the 
working through of instances - whether by recall or construction - that fit whatever event 
is under consideration. The result is a judgement that overweights certain pieces of 
information while ignoring others. 
Finally on the subject of heuristics, what are we to make of the quantitative and 
moral anchors refened to by Shiller? Shiller himself comments that 'psychological 
anchors for the market hook themselves on the strangest of things along the muddy 
bottom of our consciousness' (Shiller 2000: 147), which while being a graphic 
description does no more than hint at their actual functioning . Let us first consider 
quantitative anchors . A typical quantitative anchor might be the lowest plice that a 
particular share has reached in recent times. As an anchor, this price is the level below 
which I judge that the price will not fall. It therefore functions as a reason for my 
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purchasing the share when that pnce is reached. There are two separate aspects to 
consider here. 
The first IS that when the anchor causes me to make a purchase, it does so 
intentionalistically. That is, the anchor provides the conscious and intentional reason for 
my buying these shares at this time. But what about the 'decision' to use this anchor in 
the first place? Are anchors such as recent price highs and lows, or recent percentage 
changes, used by choice or are they things that we are predisposed to relying on in our 
judgements, perhaps because of their prominence in the absence of anything better to base 
a judgement on? On this question there is no doubt some truth to Shiller's earlier 
comment. The anchors we find ourselves basing market judgements on may be the 
outcome of conscious reflection, but what is more likely is that they are the result of 
something less considered, something more akin to a Background disposition. 
The same sort of analysis seems to apply to moral anchors, although an important 
consideration here is the idea that much of the human thinking that leads to action is in 
the form of storytelling, narrative and justification. According to Shiller, moral anchors 
have the effect that they do because convincing or compelling stories can lead to action, 
rather than requiring an analysis of the most preferred possible action. Consider how easy 
it is to act on the basis of a share tip from a friend, or to purchase the shares of companies 
that one has personal k[lowledge of. In each case one can tell vivid stOlies and these alone 
can provide sufficient reason to invest. Here again, the intentionalistic aspect of anchors 
when they cause behaviour is evident. 
Finally, consider the insensitivity of anchors to market conditions in anything 
other than exceptional circumstances. This seems to reinforce the non-intentional, 
unquestioned, nature of anchors. For example, if one of the factors in the recent 'dotcom' 
boom really was a well-established moral anchor concerning the impOltance of being 
invested in technology stocks, why did people fail to question themselves about the 
validity of the anchor? If anchors were in some sense decided upon intentionalistically, 
they would surely be consciously scrutinised in a way that they appear not to be. This 
would suggest that to be an anchor, is to be part of the Background. 
Mental Accounting 
Third and finally are the cognitive operations behind mental accounting. The first 
component of mental accounting, concerning the accounting of individual transactions, 
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has largely been dealt with under prospect theory. One additional element, represented by 
the concurrent choice problem analysed earlier, provides fUlther evidence on the Searlean 
nature of the prospect theory editing operations. Consider again the interesting feature of 
this probJem. By framing a given set of outcomes as the result either of two simple choice 
situations, or on~ compounded one, people are found to switch their preferences. The 
mental accounting explanation of this phenomenon is that people tend to retain and use 
the division suggested by the frame of the problem, rather than compound the choices. I 
would suggest that this reflects a Background disposition towards what might be termed 
'keeping things simple ' . Certainly it seems to be something we do in an unthinking way, 
as I argued were many of the prospect theory editing operations, rather than being a 
conscious decision to keep separate accounts for each part of the decision. 
The second component of mental. accounting concerns the maintenance and 
operation of categOlies, budgets and accounts. Heath and Soli (1996) describe the 
cognitive operations involved in maintaining expenditure accounts. Their analysis of a 
two stage accounting process finds that the first stage, the 'booking' of expenditures, 
relies on attention and memory, while stage two, the 'posting' of expenditures to 
accounts, relies on judgements and categOlisations. These operations, which have 
counterparts in income and wealth accounting too, are based on conscious, intentional, 
processes. Perhaps ,the more interesting issue concerns the effects associated with the 
maintenance of these accounts. Is the finding that spending tends to be matched to the 
income source, or that the dividends are spent much more freely than capital gains, a 
result of intentional or Background functioning? Since being influenced in spending by 
the 'label' attached to income is not an obviously beneficial trait, it is unlikely to be the 
result of a conscious decision to link spending to income in this way. What seems more 
likely is that such behaviour is the result of certain acquired Background dispositions. 
The final component of mental accounting, dealing with the closing, or balancing, 
of mental accounts, was argued to be of considerable importance to investor behaviour 
given its role in deterrrtining attitudes to risk. Ultimately, one always has discretion over 
the choice of time frame or boundary for the transactions within an account. The 
interesting distinction is between those activities where a natural choice of frame suggests 
itself, such as the betting day for the gambler, and those activities where there is no 
obvious frame, such as the investor who continually holds a portfolio of assets and can 
choose how often to evaluate his gains or losses . 
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In the case of the gambler, when the end of the betting day is the natural time to 
'balance the books', it seems clear that this frame functions through the Background. The 
gambler, unless intentionally trying to do otherwise, finds that drawing a line under the 
day's bets is. the natural way to proceed. As a result of this, in combination with loss 
aversion , horses with long odds will tend to be backed in the final races of the day when 
in the absence of the daily frame, a gambler would not feel obliged to take on this greater 
l;sk. Notice that as with the other areas I have analysed, this Background functioning is 
combined with the intentional causation associated with deciding upon which horses to 
back, maintaining the daily betting account, and so on. 
For the investor, typically without a natural time frame to operate within, the case 
is even more interesting. What does determine how often a portfolio is evaluated, with the 
losses suffered or the gains enjoyed? Given that whatever it is that causes the investor to 
value his portfolio frequently or otherwise directly influences his investment behaviour, 
the importance of this question is clear. In the absence of a conscious effort to work to 
some decided upon time scale, context would once again seem to be the crucial factor. 
For example, investors with low costs to time, information and trading are likely to track 
their pelformance more closely then investors who cannot afford the time to do so or to 
whom trading is expensive. The perverse result here of course is that being time 
constrained, for exampl~\ may be beneficial if it prevents myopic loss aversion. 
What about investors who realise that they suffer myopic loss aversion and decide 
to force themselves to watch their portfolio's less closely? The interesting Searlean 
observation in this context is that the investors who best manage to control themselves are 
likely to be those that can acquire the time frame they wish to use as a Background 
disposition. The investor, in effect, has to try and move portfolio monitoring away from 
the intentional brain into the Background. The development of such Background 
dispositions can usefully be thought of as part of the learning process of the investor. 
V IMPLICATIONS 
My analysis suggests that the psychological traits of the human agent in behavioural 
finance admit a Searlean interpretation in two ways. Firstly, a number of the individual 
traits considered in the behavioural finance literature seem to be best conceived of as 
Background dispositions . Secondly, the various mental processes involved in the 
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decision-making of the BFA - evaluation, judgement, mental accounting etc. - involve 
both conscious and non-conscious elements, just as SearIe's theory of intentionality and 
the Background would suggest. 
By way of final remarks, I want to comment on some implications that seem to 
follow from my analysis . First of all, the SearIean perspective reinforces a certain view of 
the rationality of the BFA that contrasts with that often given in the literature. Within 
traditional finance, the agent whose behaviour conflicts with the predictions of expected 
utility theory and Bayesian probability theory tends to be labelled 'irrational' and 
'unsophisticated', or as being representative of the behaviour of non-rational 'noise 
traders' (Kyle (1985), Black (1986)) . Even within the behavioural finance literature, 
Shleifer talks of behavioural finance as being the study of 'human fallibility in 
competitive markets' (Shleifer 2000: 24), by which he means the placing of 'the biased, 
the stupid, and the confused into competitive financial markets' (ibid.). 
Two comments seem appropriate here. The first is that rationality should not be 
confused with expected utility maximisation. Expected utility theory and prospect theory 
are both accounts of rational choice and so the decision-maker under prospect theory 
cannot be regarded as irrational, stupid or confused. But what about the non-conscious 
traits of the BFA, such as the heuristics that people fall back on to form judgements. Do 
these represent human jyrationality? From the Searlean point of view the answer is that 
they need not. The central message of Searle's analysis is that rational behaviour 
necessarily involves both conscious reasoning and non-conscious dispositions. A 
conception of rational choice that excludes the non-intentional is therefore an incomplete 
one. It is in this light that I commend Shiller's (2000: 136) assessment of the traits of the 
behavioural finance agent: 
These patterns of human behaviour are not the result of extreme human 
ignorance, but rather of the character of human intelligence . .. .Investors are 
striving to do the right thing, but they have limited abilities and certain natural 
modes of behaviour .. . 
For Shiller's 'natural modes of behaviour' I propose we read SearIe's 
Background. A Searlean perspective can therefore ground claims about the rationality or 
otherwise of a particular conception of agency. A second area to consider, albeit one that 
I can only scratch the surface of here, concerns the importance to finance of recognising 
T 
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the non-intentional, Background, factors in rational behaviour. The key point is that the 
Background always matters. The non-deliberative elements of behaviour are not 
infrequent anomalies that one's analysis can ignore. To drive home the point, I suggest 
the following as important questions within finance that will not be properly addressed 
until their non-intentional aspects are understood: 
• Why do different investors have such different models of what represent good 
investments? 
• How do people perceive risk and what determines their attitudes to risk-taking? 
• Do people adopt investment 'styles'? Can they learn to be more successful 
investors , that is, can harmful traits be overcome? 
• Is technical analysis ('charting') ever a profitable strategy? If so, do traits (such as 
the anchoring of expectations to salient price levels) explain patterns such as the 
tendency for pJice trends to reverse? 
Finally, I want to emphasise that Searle is not alone in pursuing an account of human 
ontology that incorporates the sort of dispositions and capacities found in the Background 
into human behaviour. Within economics, authors such as Hayek (1967), Polanyi (1967) 
and Lawson (1997) have developed similar ideas. While there exist differences that 
remain to be resolved between these writers' accounts and Searle's7, this paper has 
hopefully demonstrated the importance to economics of acknowledging theories of 
human ontology of this type . 
7 See Faulkner (2002b) for a Searlean perspective on Lawson's critical realist human agent. 
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INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC AGENCY l 
I INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between the information available to economic actors and what they can 
actually be presumed to know, and then how and in what form this knowledge informs 
their actions, raises some of the most difficult questions in economics. In this paper I 
concentrate on how the relationship between information and knowledge is treated in 
mainstream microeconomics. My aim is to establish that even in models that relax the 
standard assumption that actors have 'perfect' knowledge, this typically amounts to no 
more than introducing small 'black-spots' into the otherwise unlimitedly sharp and 
comprehensive knowledge that they are assumed to have of their model 'world'. I then 
show how this approach, while useful in some respects, fails to address some important 
aspects of the relationship between information and knowledge. 
My argument begins with a brief account of what is meant by information and 
knowledge. The paper then splits into two halves. The first half explores the mainstream 
economics perspective on information and knowledge by way of a detailed examination 
of a representative game theoretic model. The second half considers three aspects of the 
relationship between information and knowledge that are largely neglected on the 
mainstream approach: non-probabilistic forms of uncertainty and ignorance, the 
subjectivity of knowledge, and tacit knowledge. 
11 INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
I begin, then, by explaining what I mean by information and knowledge in what follows. 
Central to my use of these terms is the need to distinguish between what people could, in 
principle, know about their situation (information) and what it is, in fact, that they do 
1 My thanks to Jochen Runde for first suggesting the outline of the argument developed in this paper, as 
well as for many helpful comments on various drafts . I also wish to thank John Davis, Alain Marciano and 
participants at the Cambridge Realist Workshop (November 2002), Newnham College, Cambridge, for their 
comments on an earlier draft of the paper. 
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know (knowledge) . To capture this distinction, I define information to mean any sort of 
fact about the world, where a fact is simply a property of the world, for example, that 
something exists, has occurred, takes a particular form, and so on2• Knowledge then refers 
to the beliefs and capabilities which people possess that embody information. 
Now since beliefs and capabilities are quite different forms of knowledge, the two 
must be treated separately. Let me begin with beliefs. Knowledge in the form of beliefs 
conesponds to propositional knowledge (knowledge that). Such knowledge, acquired 
through vatious forms of exposure to infonnation (studying, communicating, 
introspection, and so on), is directly available to the conscious mind. The important issue 
with this type of knowledge concerns the criterion to be used in determining which of our 
beliefs count as knowledge. In the philosophical literature a common assumption is that 
true belief is a necessary condition for knowledge, while some philosophers go further 
and argue that justification , when added to true belief, is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for knowledge3• 
Now certainly I wish to rule out as knowledge those beliefs that are plainly false, 
since they do not embody information. Yet true belief may not provide a necessary 
condition for beliefs to be considered knowledge. The point here is that our beliefs are 
often only accurate in some regards, whether because they are partial or fragmentary, or 
because they are only approximately true. Now in many cases such beliefs ought to be 
recognised as knowledge, since they still provide a reliable basis for action. Suppose I 
believe that the time is ten o'clock, when in actual fact the true time is five minutes past 
ten. If I am planning to catch the two minutes past ten train, then my belief that it is ten 0' 
clock is sufficiently inaccurate that it ought not be regarded as knowledge. Yet for 
deciding whether it is time for my morning cup of coffee, my belief is likely to be more 
than good enough. The problem resides in the notion of there being an absolute standard 
by which we can judge a belief to be knowledge or not, since it would seem that what 
counts as knowledge depends on the situation. In what follows then I intend to regard 
2 My definition of information therefore differs from that of some authors who draw a distinction between 
facts and information, where information consists of facts that have already been systematised in some way. 
3 See Hands (2001: 144-150) for a more detai led account of debates surrounding belief-based definitions of 
knowledge. As will become clear later, mainstream microeconomic theory tends to equate knowledge with 
true belief, to the point of assuming a perfect correspondence between actors' beliefs about their world and 
the world itself. 
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beliefs as knowledge when they are true relative to the context in which they play a part, 
recognising that even this definition leaves the possibility of substantial grey areas. 
In addition to beliefs, I also identified capabilities as being a form of knowledge. 
While beliefs correspond to propositional knowledge, capabilities that embody 
information cOlTespond to tacit, sub-conscious, functioning knowledge (knowledge 
how)4. Here I am thinking of such capabilities as our tacitly functioning ability to ride a 
bicycle or to adhere to the rules of grammar when communicating, without the need for 
conscious reflection. Such capabilities are again the result of exposure to information, in 
this case via example, practice, repetition, and so forth. In section VII I consider the 
impact of the neglect of tacit knowledge in standard mainstream microeconomic models 
of the sort considered in the following two sections. I therefore defer further comment on 
tacit knowledge until then. 
III A GAME OF COMPLETE INFORMATION 
In this section and the next I consider the treatment of information and knowledge in 
mainstream microeconomic theory. I do so using the example of a one-shot Coumot 
duopoly game, first und~r conditions of what game theorists call 'complete information' 
and then, in the next section, under conditions of 'incomplete information'. I have chosen 
this example, partly because it is simple and compact enough to be considered in full, but 
mainly because it is highly representative of the kind of analytical approach widely 
adopted in contemporary economics. My aim in this section is to demonstrate the 
conventional assumption that actors' knowledge of the contents of their 'model world' 
con'esponds exactly to the formal expression of that world. That is, knowledge and 
information in these models coincide perfectly. In the section that follows, I argue that 
even in models that explicitly recognise that information and knowledge are not 
coextensive, this amounts only to introducing small 'black-spots' into the otherwise 
perfect knowledge attributed to the actors concerned. 
4 While I concentrate in thi s essay on John Searle ' s understanding of capabilities as a form of knowledge, a 
similar point is made in modern pragmatist thought (Joas 1993, 1996; Plotkin 1994; Putnam 1995). See 
Hands (2001 ) for an account of the pragmatist revi val in modern philosophy of science. 
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A game is one of complete information if the structure of the game (the moves, 
the payoffs, and so on) is common knowledge to all of the players5. The particular game I 
shall consider here involves two firms, A and B, in competition as the sole suppliers of a 
homogenous .good. The firms simultaneously choose their prefelTed output (qA and qB), 
each knowing that total demand for the good is characterised by the inverse demand 
function: 
P(Q) = a - Q 
where Q = qA + qB. The firms employ identical technologies, such that the total cost to 
firm i of producing a quantity qi is: 
I assume that a > Q in equilibrium (such that the market clears at a strictly positive price) 
and that c < a. The structure of the game is assumed to be common knowledge, 
something I return to after reviewing the solution to the game. 
The standard game-theoretic solution to the one-shot COUlTIOt game with complete 
information is the Nasl'l. equiliblium. This involves determining a pair of strategies, one 
for each firm, such that each firm is maximising its payoff given the strategy being played 
by the other. Strategies for each firm are simply quantities, and the payoffs are the firms' 
profits. Expressed as a function of the strategies chosen by each firm, profits for firm i 
given firmj's output are: 
The strategy pair (q/, qB *) IS a Nash equilibrium if, for each film 
maximisation problem: 
* * max 1(i(qi, qj ) = max q,{a - (qi + qj ) - c] 
* i, qi solves the 
5 A proposition is common knowledge in some social system if everyone in that system knows it, everyone 
knows that everyone knows it , everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on. 
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The first-order condition for this problem, which is both necessary and sufficient given 
the assumptions made about demand and technology, is : 
qi = 1/2(a - q/ - c) 
This means that for the strategy palr (qA *, qB *) to be a Nash equilibrium, the firms' 
quantity choices must satisfy: 
q/ = Y2(a - q/ -c) 
* * qB = Y2(a - qA -c) 
Simultaneously solving this palr of equations yields the Nash equilibrium pair of 
strategies: 
The model having been set up and solved, my interest now is in the assumptions 
about information and knowledge that the model makes (leaving aside the meaning and 
significance of the NasQ solution). Remember that information was defined to be any fact 
about the world. In the context of the 'model world' I have just considered, then, 
information consists exactly of no more and no less than the formal statement of the 
world: 
1) The Players 
The players consist of two identical firms that : 
• produce an identical good; 
• are fully described by their cost function; and 
• are rational in the sense that they are single-minded in their goal of profit 
maximisation and peIfect reasoners in the sense that they do not make any 
slips or other mistakes of reasoning, choose consistently, and are able to 
deduce the full logical consequences of all the knowledge that is atttibuted to 
them; and 
• possess common knowledge of their situation. 
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2) The Environment 
The environment consists of: 
• the demand conditions for the good being produced, that IS, the inverse 
demand function; and 
• the restrictions that Cl > Q in equiliblium and c < Cl. 
1) and 2) together exhaust the 'world' of the Cournot game. Considering now what the 
two players know about their world, I said earlier that the game is one of 'complete 
information' in the tenninology of game theory, meaning that the structure of the game is 
common knowledge to both players. This means, in the first place, that both firms know 
not only their own charactelistics, but also those of their competitor and the market they 
are operating in. Knowing, here, amounts to a perfect conespondence between actors' 
beliefs about each aspect of their model world and the formal expression of those aspects. 
That is to say, actors are assumed to know their world in terms of exactly the same 
mathematical expressions in which it is written down (i.e. there are no ambiguities, 
misinterpretations, and so on , which it is of course one of the purposes of fOlmal analysis 
to ensure). The model reviewed is thus very much in accordance with the so-called 
'perfect knowledge' assumption of standard neoclassical theorl. In the second place, it 
means that what each firm is assumed to know about the other firm's knowledge takes a 
particular form. Specifically, not only does Firm A know everything about the world it 
operates in, it also knows that Firm B knows everything about its world, and that Firm B 
knows that Firm A knows everything, and so on. The same applies with respect to Film 
B's knowledge of what Film A knows. 
It will be apparent that the assumption of complete information is a demanding 
one, and the last thirty years or so have seen a great deal of work in economic theory 
aimed at investigating the consequences of relaxing it (see Stiglitz's (1994) review of the 
so-called 'information theoretic' approach to economic analysis). I shall attempt to 
6 Notwithstanding that the game is one of 'imperfect information ' in the terminology of game theory, since 
both firms move simultaneously without knowing, and being unable to deduce, the level of output the other 
firm will choose. Common knowledge of the game, then, even in conjunction with common knowledge of 
rationality, is not enough to ensure that the firm will play their Nash strategies (although being perfect 
reasoners they will know that if they do not play their Nash strategies they will not be in equilibrium). But 
this is a wider problem that need not detain us here. 
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convey the flavour of this approach and the modelling strategy it adopts, by introducing a 
restliction on the knowledge of one of the firms in the Cournot game. 
IV A GAME OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
I now assume that both firms know everything about their 'world' that they knew before, 
except that Firm A does not know Firm B's costs (perhaps because B has developed new 
technology or is a recent entrant into the market). This is what I shall call a 'black-spot'. 
The game becomes one of incomplete information in the terminology of game theory, 
since the structure of the game is no longer common knowledge to both films . As will 
become apparent, this version of the game breaks with the assumption of a perfect 
cOlTespondence between information and knowledge in the game of complete information 
considered in the preceding section . 
How does this informational asymmetry change the game theoretic analysis of the 
Cournot duopoly? In order for game theory to get going, some specific form must be 
given to Firm A's ignorance of Firm B' s costs, so that in turn some form can be given to 
A's knowledge of the payoffs it faces. The standard move here, Oliginally suggested by 
Harsanyi (1967) , is to ~uppose that while Firm A does not know Firm B's true costs, it 
does know that Firm B is one of a given set of possible 'types' of firm, where each type is 
distinguished .by its level of costs. For example, in the simple case to be considered here, 
Firm B is one of two possible types, either low cost or high cost. Whereas Firm A knew 
Firm B's type in the example of the last section, Firm A's knowledge has now been 
slightly reduced (the 'black-spot') . The crucial assumption here is that the contents of the 
'black-spot' can be expressed probabilistically over the set of possible types. For in this 
way Firm A's payoffs (profits) can be constructed in terms of expected profits conditional 
on Firm B's type. 
To show how this change alters the game theoretic analysis of the Cournot game, I 
shall now derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game under conditions of 
asymmetric information 7. It is common knowledge that Firm B knows both its costs and 
7 The Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires a strategy to be specified for each possible type of player, 
although the reason for this need not detain us greatly. Essentially a Bayesian Nash equilibrium still 
requi res that each player play the ir best response to the strategies played by their opponents. Since not all 
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those of Firm A. Firm A however only knows that Firm B's marginal costs are CH with 
probability p and CL with probability (1 - p). This too is common knowledge. The rest of 
the model is ~s before. The firms compete by simultaneously choosing their output and 
the inverse demand function is as it was before: 
P(Q) = Cl - Q 
Given that Firm A's cost function is: 
and Firm B's cost function: 
CB(qB) = CHqB with probability p 
CB(qB) = CLqB with probability (l - p) 
we can determine the maximisation problem that each type of firm faces 8• Let qB *(CH) and 
qB *(CL) denote Firm B's quantity choices as a function of its cost, and let qA * denote Firm 
----A's quantity choice. 
If Firm B's cost is high, it chooses qB *(CH) to solve: 
If Firm B's cost is low , it chooses qB *(CL) to solve: 
players know the type of their opponents , strategies for some players will be conditional on the strategies of 
all possible types of each of their opponents . Therefore for the equilibrium to consist of best response 
strategies by each player, some (or all) player's strategies must specify a plan for each of their possible 
types, since otherwise we cannot know whether or not all players are playing their best response. In my 
example, if the solution concept were not to specify a plan for each possible type of Firm B then we could 
not determine whether or not Firm A is playing its best response to Firm B's plan, since Firm A's profits 
(and so optimal choice) depend on the plans of both low and high cost type Firm Bs. 
8 With CL < CH. 
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Firm A knows that Firm B's cost is high with probability p and should anticipate that Firm 
B's quantity choice will be q/ (CH) or qB*(cd, depending on its costs. Thus Firm A 
chooses qA * to solve: 
so as to maximise expected profit. The first-order conditions for these three optimisation 
problems are: 
qB *(CH) = (a - qA * - cH)12 
qB *(CL) = (a - qA * - c,J/2 
qA * = (a - C - pqB *(CH) - (1 - P)qB *(cL))12 
Assuming that the two firms' costs are not too different - if they are, then the 
high-cost firm produces nothing - these first-order conditions characterise the solutions to 
the earlier maximisation problems. Solving the first-order conditions gives: 
qB *(Cf-/) = (a - 2cf-/ + c)/3 +(1 - P)(CH - cL)/6 
qB "(CL) = (a - 2CL + c)/3 - p (CH - CL)/6 
qA * = (a - 2c + PCH + (1 - p)cL)/3 
which cOlTesponds to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game. Comparing the solution 
of this Coumot game with incomplete information, to the earlier COUlTIOt game with 
complete information, we can say that a 'high-cost ' (,Iow-cost') type Firm B produces 
more (less) in equilibrium when Firm A is ignorant of Firm B's type as compared with the 
complete information case, since Firm B knows that Firm A is maximising expected, 
rather than actual , profit. 
As before, I wish to examine the information and knowledge contained in the 
game. To save repetition however, I will focus simply on what has changed now that 
there is an asymmetry in what the firms know. In terms of the information in the model, 
we simply observe that for whatever reason, Firm A conceives of there being two possible 
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types of Firm B and attaches a certain probability to the likelihood of each. The set of 
types and the probability distribution are information according to my definition, as is the 
fact that Firm A is an expected profit maxi miser. 
If we now consider the knowledge that the game presumes the firms to possess, 
Firm B continues to have full knowledge, in the sense that its knowledge cOlTesponds 
exactly with the information in the game. Yet the scenario was designed to allow for Firm 
A's knowledge to be limited in some regard, in this case with respect to its knowledge of 
Firm B's costs. It is now clear how games of incomplete information restIict the 
limitations that can be imposed on a player's knowledge (and ignorance). Although we 
started with the assumption that Firm A was ignorant of Firm B's costs, in solving the 
game we have that Firm A is far from ignorant. Rather, Firm A knows accurately the set 
of possible cost-types of Firm B and the probability distribution with which nature draws 
the particular type. All that Firm A suffers from is a 'black-spot' in its knowledge of its 
world, not knowing which type Firm B actually is. 
This kind of approach is widely employed In the economics of information, 
namely to begin with a world in which all information is transparent and available to the 
actors concerned and then to study what happens when there is some perturbation, namely 
when one or more of the actors involved suffers a 'black-spot' (and where the usual move 
is to replace knowledge of a certain outcome or state of affairs with certain knowledge of 
a list of possible outcomes or states of affairs with their associated probabilities). While 
models of this kind are illuminating in some respects, they gloss over the differences 
between information and knowledge and, accordingly, the ways in which these 
differences may matter for the way that we think about economic phenomena. My claim 
then is that such a modelling approach necessarily limits the mainstream microeconomic 
analysis of imperfect knowledge. To develop this argument, I now move on to discuss 
three important aspects of economic agency that are neglect~d or obscured on the 
mainstream approach. 
V UNCERTAINTY AND IGNORANCE 
The first feature of the mainstream approach to information and knowledge that I 
consider concerns its treatment of uncertainty. Now since the points I want to raise here 
relate to the expected utility (EU) model of decision-making under uncertainty widely 
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employed in mainstream economics, I begin by briefly looking at the main features of the 
EU model. Within this framework an actor's decision problem is reduced to three basic 
elements: a set of available acts aj (i = 1,2, ... , m) between which an actor must choose; a 
set of mutually exclusive 'states of the world' Sj U = 1,2, .. . , n), one of which must occur 
once a choice has been made; and a set of possible consequences, one for each act/state 
pair, cij. Together, these three elements give the familiar Acts/States/Consequences matrix 
associated with the EU model: 
States 
Cln 
Acts 
Clnn 
The prefelTed action of an actor within the EU model, subject to that actor 
satisfying certain axioms of 'rational choice'9, is the act (or acts) which yields at least as 
high an expected utility as any other act, where the expected utility of an act is simply the 
mathematical expectation of the utility of the consequences of the act: 
11 
U(a.) = 6 pU(C) 
1 J 1J 
)=1 
where Pj U = 1, 2, ... , n) are the probabilities representing the actor's beliefs about the 
states of nature and u(c..) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, defined over all 
1J 
possible consequences of the decision. 
Although the EU model continues to dominate mainstream analyses of decision-
making . under uncertainty, such a simple model is inevitably a highly stylised 
9 Economists have established various different sets of axioms that are sufficient for an actor's decision-
making to be described by the ED model (Marschak 1950; Savage 1954; von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1947). See Bacharach (1976) , chapter 2, for a proof of how such axioms lead to the ED representation. 
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representation of actual human behaviour. Here I will restlict myself to commenting on 
the conception of uncertainty associated with the EU model, in particular focusing on the 
extent to which it captures the nature and severity of the kinds of uncertainties decisions-
makers actually face in their day-to-day lives. I intend to concentrate on two points that 
are often raised in this respect: the particular way that that the EU model represents 
uncertainty and its neglect of an important form of ignorance. 
Uncertainty in the EU model arises from the decision maker not knowing which 
of the possible states of the world will be realised (except in degenerate cases where the 
probability of some state is 1) and, hence, which consequence will actually follow from 
each act under consideration. This uncertainty is quantified by way of a classical 
probability distribution defined over the set of states, with questions concerning the 
nature and source of these probabilities typically ignored. In many EU models the 
probabilities in question are simply assumed to cOlTespond to objective frequencies, while 
in other cases, where objective frequencies are not available, theorists fall back on a 
subjectivist or 'Bayesian' conception of probability. On the subjectivist view rational 
actors are simply assumed to have numerically definite personal probabilities about 
random events at the back of their minds at all times, which they update in a Bayesian 
fashion. 
While some of the decision-situations we encounter in day-to-day life clearly are 
of the sort that involve obvious (or at least calculable) objective frequencies, such 
situations are .actually rather rare. Much more common is the case in which people do not 
have access to such probabilities and are forced to fall back on their own judgements. 
Now this raises two main problems for the EU model and consequently for the 
mainstream approach that employs it. The first concerns the implausibility of the 
assumption that people always act 'as-if' they possess numerically definite probabilities. 
As Ellsberg (1961) first illustrated, even faced with choices between simple lotteries, 
many people exhibit behaviour that contradicts the assumption that they possess 
numerically definite subjective probabilities JO • The second problem here is that many 
JO Two distinct theoretical approaches to accommodating such choices have emerged in the economics 
literature. The first , the so-called 'multiple prior' approach, drops the assumption that people possess 
unique subjective probabilities, in favour of supposing that they possess interval-valued probabilities 
(Bewley 1986; Casadesus-Masanell et al. 2000; Chen and Epstein 2002; Epstein and Wang 1994; 
Gardenfors and Sahlin 1982; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989, 1993; Kelsey 1993, 1994; Kelsey and Milne 
'~ 
11 
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important aspects of economic behaviour appear to be the consequence of people not 
always having reliable probabilities on which to act, and therefore not acting in the 
manner envisaged by the EU model. Here I have in mind certain forms of convention 
(Keynes 1973); rule-following, habits and behavioural routines (Cyert and March 1992; 
Hodgson 1997; Vanberg 1994); as well as various phenomena concerned (in the first 
instance at least) with betting behaviour, such as ambiguity aversion (Camerer and Weber 
1992, Epstein 1999) and the competence hypothesis (Heath and Tversky 1991). 
The second issue I want to raise in relation to the treatment of uncertainty in the 
EU model concerns the assumption that actors always know the full set of mutually 
exclusive possible states of the world relevant to their decision prob1ems"·12. Such a 
requirement is likely to be difficult to fulfil in practice. For one thing, actors are unlikely 
to possess the degree of imagination required in order to determine the full set of possible 
outcomes associated with a decision problem. To compound this problem, some authors 
note that the consequences of a decision may not even exist as possibilities at the time of 
taking the decision (Shackle 1972) and therefore cannot be conceived of by actors at the 
time of acting. But even in situations in which actors have a reasonably good idea about 
the possible eventualities that may follow from their actions, by assuming that all actors 
know the full set of possible states of the world, the EU model ignores the fact that there 
remains an inevitable clegree of arbitrariness where actors will draw the boundaries 
between one state and the next. Consequently actors are likely to 'divide up' the possible 
1999; Kelsey and Quiggin 1992; Kyburg 1990; Levi 1986). The second approach incorporates the 
reliability of, or weight of evidence for , a judgement by replacing subjective probability with a non-additive 
capacity or weight (Dow and Werlang 1992a, 1992b; Eichberger and Kelsey 1999; Fox and Tversky 1998; 
Gilboa 1987 ; Schmeidler 1989). See Runde (2001) for a fuller discussion of some of the issues raised by 
these models. 
11 In game theory, at least in games of incomplete information that employ the Harsanyi transformation to 
convert the game into one of imperfect information, as in section IV, the states of nature consist of the 
possible types of each player. And as we saw in the case of the Cournot game, the full set of possible states 
of nature and associated probabilities are common knowledge to all players, a practice that is not 
unproblematic due to possible difficulties with the use of Bayesian rationality (i.e . the Savage axioms) in 
the context of strategic interaction (see Mariotti 1995, 1997) . 
12 In principle the EU model need not require an actor to correctly know the full set of possible states of the 
world , merely that he have some conception of the possible states and to act on the basis of this conception. 
Yet this is not the way models of this sort usually proceed, since all actors are assumed to have the same, 
correct, conception of the set of poss ible states . 
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eventualities in quite different ways (see the discussion on the Background in the 
following section), contrary to the usual assumptions of the EU model. 
The implication of the mainstream's neglect of these fOlms of non-quantifiable 
uncertainties .and ignorance is to radically understate the extent to which indeterminacies 
are a feature of economic life. Now mainstream models do not eliminate indeterminacy 
altogether; for instance, even the simplest of games can have multiple equilibria l3. Yet by 
virtue of the possibilities in these models always being pre-specified and therefore 
limited, the mainstream approach does rule out indetelminacies both on the scale, and of 
the sort, envisaged here. Contrary to the EU model, actors are not typically able to 
determine all possible states of the world. Rather each comes up with a more or less 
accurate view of what might happen, where these views are in part contingent on each 
actor's own situation and background. Opinions about what may happen, and about what 
other actors think may happen, vary considerably and are liable to sudden, unpredictable, 
changes. Consequently models of the sort under consideration here, and more specifically 
the standard assumptions of the EU model that they embody, ignore phenomena such as 
vague and unreliable probabilities, novelty and surprise. In turn this means that these 
models do not have the resources to accommodate phenomena in which vague 
probabilities, novelty and surprise are important: previously unimagined moves by firms 
in a competitive environ)11ent, the notion of entrepreneurial 'alertness' associated with the 
Austrian conception of the market process, the growth of knowledge, and so on l4 • 
VI THE SUBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
An important characteristic of mainstream models of the sort reviewed earlier is that the 
actors within them know their world as, and in exactly the same mathematical terms in 
which, it is written down by the economist, save of course where one or more of the 
actors suffer some or other 'black-spot'. With this exception, actors in these models are 
13 The game of Heads and Tails is a good example. This game involves two players independently choosing 
Heads or Tails , where both of them know they will receive a prize if they both make the same choice and 
nothing otherwise. This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies (Heads, Heads) and (Tails, Tails), 
but there is nothing in the formal structure of the game to gi ve the players a reason to choose either Heads 
or Tails. 
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endowed with a God's-eye view of their world, there being effectively a one-to-one 
relation between that world as it is and what they know about it. 
One thing that this conception ignores is that our knowledge of our circumstances 
is in general highly subjective, being dependent on our intentions and desires, past 
experiences and knowledge, geographical and temporal location, physical and emotional 
state, and so on 15. As a result, our knowledge of the world rarely cOlTesponds to the world 
as it actually is in a simple one-to-one way. While the 'black-spot' manoeuvre could be 
interpreted as a first step towards acknowledging this subjectivity, since it at least allows 
the knowledge of actors in these models to differ, the nature, causes and effects of the 
subjectivity of knowledge do not significantly contribute to mainstream analyses. Now 
the range of possible issues I might consider here is vast and as such I intend to focus 
exclusively on one important factor in the subjectivity of knowledge, namely the 
structured nature of all conscious experience. To this end I draw on the philosopher John 
Searle's (1983, 1994a, 1995, 1999) work on consciousness and intentionalityI6. While not 
uncontroversial in some quarters, I regard Searle's work as providing a clear and 
commonsensical account on which to base a discussion of the subjectivity of knowledge. 
Searle's account of the structured nature of conscious experience starts from the 
idea that many conscious mental states are intentional 17, in the sense that they are 
intIinsically about, or dlrected towards, something or someone. Thus you may intend to 
14 On this, see in particular Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1985, 1989) . 
15 Within economics, this issue is closely related to the much broader issue of subjectivism (see Horwitz 
1994, Kirzner 1995) . A key tenet of the Austrian school and the writings of Menger, von Mises, Hayek, 
Knight and Shackle, subjectivists argue that any adequate explanation of human interactions and institutions 
must start with the subjective meaning that individuals attach to their actions, that is, must begin from the 
subjective mental states of the actors being studied. From thi s starting-point, Kirzner distinguishes three 
quite different expressions of subjectivism in modern economic thought; that found in mainstream 
economics , the radical subjectivism of Shackle and Lachmann, and the more moderate subjectivism of 
modern Austrian thought. The particular issue under consideration here, based on the distinction between 
actors perceptions of reality and that reality itself, and subsequently the roles played by context and 
interpretation in economic affairs , is central to both the second and third of these expressions, although it 
need not imply some of the more nihilistic findings associated with the Shackle-Lachmann view. 
16 A similar perspective is supported by work on perceptual schema and cognitive framing in cognitive 
theory (e.g. BruneI' 1973, L10yd 1972) and recent work in psychology (Cl ark 1997; Cosmides and Tooby 
1994b; Margolis 1994; Plotk in 1994), which emphasises the role that context plays in human reasoning. 
17 But not all. For instance, one may have conscious feelings of anxiety that have no specific focus or target. 
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purchase a share, remember that you purchased a share, wish that you had purchased a 
share, and so on. Intending, remembering and wishing are all intentional states by virtue 
of the fact that they are necessarily directed at something, in this case the purchase of a 
share. Many intentional states, particularly those whose content is a proposition, have 
what Searle calls conditions of satisfaction, namely the conditions that must be met for an 
intention to be fulfilled, a belief to be true, and so on. Thus the condition of satisfaction of 
my belief that I will buy a new bicycle tomonow is that I do in fact do so. 
By virtue of intlinsically refening to, or being about, other things, intentional 
states are considered to be crucial by Searle in mediating the mind's causal relations with 
the external world. One aspect of this is the mechanism by which intentional mental states 
function causally in rational behaviour, what Searle terms the mechanism of intentional 
causation. The central proposition here is that intentional states function dUling rational 
behaviour by virtue of their contents being consciously scrutinised so as to establish their 
conditions of satisfaction. For example, a desire functions causally as a result of being 
consciously examined to determine what actions must be carried out in order for it to be 
fulfilled. 
Searle then notes that in general intentional states never function in isolation. 
Instead they depend firstly on a network of other intentional states. My desire to purchase 
a new bicycle for instan~e only functions in association with my knowing the location of 
a nearby bicycle shop and how much I can afford to spend. But the functioning of these 
intentional states also depends on non-intentional capabilities or what Searle terms an 
actor's Background: a reservoir of non-intentional 'capacities, abilities, tendencies, 
habits, dispositions, taken-for-granted presuppositions and "know-how" generally' 
(Searle 1999: 107-108). In contrast to intentional states, Background capacities operate 
without conscious intervention or reflection. As Searle would have it then, conscious 
intentionality consists of thought processes that work in the way they do relative to a 
Background of unthought capacities, skills and know-how. 
Rather than prove the existence of the Background, Searle (1983: 145) instead 
prefers to demonstrate his thesis by the accretion of examples. His favourite ones are 
linguistic in nature , and specifically deal with how the Background enables linguistic 
interpretation. Consider the three statements: 
Tom opened the door. 
Sam opened his book at page 37. 
The surgeon opened the wound. 
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While each sentence shares the same basic form , 'X opened Y', what we 
understand by the word 'opened' in each case clearly differs. To be told that Tom has 
opened the door does not lead us to imagine Tom in an operating theatre carefully cutting 
into the door with a scalpel. Nor do we imagine the surgeon looking for a door handle. 
Instead, we cOlTectly detelmine the meaning of each sentence without any conscious act 
of interpretation. Searle proposes that this ability is one instance of our Background 
capabilities. 
The functioning of the Background is not restricted to fixing the semantic content 
of sentences. Searle maintains that all intentional states only function against a set of non-
intentional Background skills. While the determination of the conditions of satisfaction of 
an intentional state firstly requires other intentional states, the process of drawing 
consciously on additional intentional states does not, and cannot, go on forever. At some 
point the process of intentional causation always 'bottoms out' on non-intentional, non-
conscious, Background capacities which contribute to the determination of the intentional 
states conditions of satisfa.ction but that require no conscious intervention. 
Turning now to consider the structured nature of conscious experience, Searle 
argues that all intentional mental states possess 'aspectual shape' (Searle 1994a: 156-
157), which refers to the fact that whenever we perceive or think about something, we 
necessarily do so under particular aspects and not others. But to experience something as 
something, that is experience something under a certain aspect, we must already be 
familiar with the set of categories under which we experience that aspect. Thus our ability 
to recognise a piece of paper as an invoice presupposes that we already have the category 
of 'invoice'. The same goes for most of the objects and events that fill our everyday life, 
which we recognise immediately and without apparent effort. Searle regards the 
knowledge, and ability to apply, such categories as a Background ability. 
The structuring of consciousness by the Background is not limited to individual 
objects or momentary events. The Background also conditions our experiences In a 
dynamic way, by providing perceptual and linguistic categories that extend over 
sequences of events and which allow us to structure those sequences into comprehensible 
narrative shapes (Searle 1995: 134-135). These 'dramatic' categories allow us to form 
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what Searle calls 'scenarios of expectations', our taken-for-granted conceptions of how 
certain kinds of situations typically unfold, such as our negotiating to purchase a bicycle 
or our paying for a meal at a restaurant. Thus we become accustomed to and take for 
granted certai.n courses of events as following on from each other. 
That the structuring of conscious experience is a significant cause of the 
subjectivity of knowledge follows from the fact that many of the categories we draw on 
are learned rather than being innate. Consequently these categories are a function of the 
social and cultural environment in which we have grown up and the way in which these 
past experiences have shaped our Background. As a result, although we all have many 
shared sets of categories, we each of us have also acquired significantly different sets of 
categories that we draw on. Now once we recognise that each of us interprets or structures 
the information we receive in different ways, a range of phenomena become possible that 
the mainstream approach excludes by virtue of assuming a strict one-to-one relationship 
between information and knowledge. 
Perhaps the simplest illustration of the kind of effect that I have in mind here is 
provided by the example of two actors who may have quite different experiences of the 
same event. For instance suppose the event concerned is a controversial incident at a 
football match or the latest stock market announcement of a listed company. In the first 
case an actor ' s view o( the event will in part depend on the football team that they 
support; while in the second the knowledge derived from the company's statement is 
likely to depend on whether an actor holds a short or long position in the company 
concerned, or otherwise has prior expectations about the outlook for the company. 
Recently, insights of this kind have begun to attract the attention of some 
economists, albeit those from outside of the mainstream. The notion that individuals 
engage in mental accounting (Thaler 1980, 1999), operating a set of rules by which they 
organise, evaluate and keep track of their financial activities ; or that individuals 
implement a set of basic editing operations when faced with simple gambles (Kahneman 
2000; Kahneman and Tversky 1979) prior to evaluating the available alternatives; 
incorporates the idea that the set of rules and categories that people implement is partly 
subjective and that their knowledge of these rules and implementation of them is in part a 
tacit, Background operation. The related finding that individuals tend to be susceptible to 
'framing effects', being unconsciously influenced by the presentation of a decision-
situation (Camerer 2000; Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997; Tversky and Kahneman 
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1981, 1986) also appears to presuppose an account of conscious experience simjJar to that 
portrayed here (Faulkner 2002a). 
VII TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
The final feature of the mainstream modelling approach that I wish to highlight is that the 
actors within these models are assumed to form comprehensive, conscious representations 
of their decision-situations and, on the basis of these representations, to deliberate 
consciously (and pelfectly) about the best way to proceed in those situations. The 
associated conception of knowledge is of that which resides in propositional form, that is, 
a form suited to the direct application of discursive reasoning. Indeed, as I showed above, 
this is exactly the form in which knowledge is 'given ' to the economic actors in the 
models concerned. 
By interpreting mainstream models in this way, as descriptions of the way 
economic actors actually behave, I recognise that I am reading more into these models 
than many economists would be prepared to . Some economists hold the view that formal 
models such as these should only be viewed in terms of their predictive adequacy and that 
they are not meant as descriptions of what people actually do (Friedman 1953). Others 
view such models in normative terms, as showing what a rational actor should do in a 
given situation. Yet even if these alternative interpretations are appropriate to certain 
models in certain situations, it is hard not to interpret the sort of models that I consider 
here in a descriptive way. The objective of much of game theory is to model the SOlis of 
situations that real economic actors find themselves in and to analyse them by 
reconstructing the discursive reasoning of actors about what constitutes their best course 
of action given their expectations about what the other actors will do. The Cournot game 
examined earlier is just such a model, where the focus is on how a firm engaged in 
Cournot competition will react when its knowledge of its competitors costs is less than 
perfect. 
The key point that I wish to make in this section is that economists ' obsession 
with formal rational choice models, and the exclusive appeal to conscious, propositional 
knowledge that this entails, has led to a neglect of tacit knowledge in mainstream 
economics. By tacit knowledge I mean knowledge in the form of the many skills, 
capacities and dispositions that human actors routinely draw on without conscious 
89 
reflection . In contrast to propositional knowledge, which operates at the foreground of the 
mind and tends to be readily codifiable and communicable, tacit knowledge is often 
difficult to express and need not be consciously thought about when enacted. In my view 
mainstream .rational choice theory deflects attention from , first , the extent to which 
human behaviour relies on tacit rather than conscious functioning, and second, the fact 
that conscious, propositional knowledge always functions in conjunction with tacit 
knowledge. I shall consider these points in tum , beginning with the idea that human 
behaviour is driven by non-conscious skills, routines and habits as much as it is by 
conscious beliefs and desires. The point is quite widely recognised in non-mainstream 
contributions (e.g. Hayek 1948; Polanyi 1967; Nelson and Winter 1982; Rebel' 1993; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Lawson 1997; Ambrosini 2003) but rather than reviewing 
this literature, I shall instead focus in some detail on one particular example, that of 
heuristic based judgement. 
The idea that actors frequently employ heuristics, or simple rules of thumb, to 
guide their behaviour first emerges in economics in Simon' s work on satisficing (Simon 
1956). More recently the idea of heuristic-based judgement has received considerable 
attention in behavioural finance as an explanation for the persistent biases observed in 
individuals' probability judgements (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982; Shefrin 2000; 
Wameryd 2001). One,common heUlistic is availability (Tversky and Kahneman 1982; 
Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1982), according to which actors tend to judge the 
likelihood of .an event based on the ease with which instances of that event can be brought 
to mind. An investor assessing the likelihood of a particular company going bankrupt for 
example, is often guided by the number of similar company failures that he can recall. 
The notion of availability serves as a useful example for my purposes because 
such heuristics function tacitly and, as such, exemplifies a number of points about tacit 
knowledge in general. The tacit nature of the heuristic lies in the fact that, rather than 
consciously deciding to focus only on information conceming how easy it is to recall or 
imagine possible instances of some class of event, the actor's conscious mind is 
'automatically' focussed on information relating only to availability. In effect heUlistics, 
and tacit knowledge in general, serve to economise on the conscious effort required of an 
actor, by concentrating the conscious mind on only the most important, rather than all, 
aspects of behaviour. 
The benefit to heuristic-guided judgement comes from the fact that the more 
complicated the actor's environment, the better the actor is likely to perform by following 
I ' 
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a heuristic rather than by consciously reasoning in accordance with the Savage axioms or 
some such l8 . The reason for this lies in the boundedness of human mental capacities. 
Suppose that an actor has complete information on which to make a judgement. Given 
lirrlited computational power (be this for lack of time or ability) an actor may make more 
accurate judgements on average by being predisposed towards focussing only on 
information concerning availability rather than performing an incomplete or inaccurate 
Bayesian calculation, attempting but failing to correctly incorporate all information l9• The 
situation becomes even more favourable towards the heuristic-guided actor when 
complete information is not freely available. For, before any calculation, actors must 
decide how much effort to put into searching for information. The heuristic-guided actor 
immediately focuses on availability, whereas the Bayesian actor must decide in which 
direction to search by comparing the costs of search relative to its (unknown) benefits . 
Against the advantages associated with economising on conscious effort, the 
disadvantages to tacit knowledge follow from the elimination of complete conscious 
reflection . Again our example of heuristic-guided judgement demonstrates the point. The 
disadvantage to relying on heuristics is that the resulting judgements will tend to be 
biased. The availability heuristic, for instance, is susceptible to the fact that factors other 
than frequency and probability affect the ease with which instances of an event can be 
brought to mind. The likelihood of an event which has received widespread media 
attention, or that is particularly salient to an individual by virtue of past experience, is 
likely to be consistently overstated by an individual forming judgements in accordance 
with availability. 
The example of judgmental heuristics also suggests a number of additional 
observations that may be made about tacit knowledge and rational choice models. First, 
and as they are usually presented, the actors in these models would gain nothing from 
18 Evolutionary psychology (e .g., Cosmides and Tooby 1994a) notes that since certain of the heuristics that 
we employ may reflect inherited computational devices tailored to problems faced by past generations, not 
all the heuristics we now employ need be beneficial with respect to our present circumstances. 
19 Such a situation might be termed the curse of information, since an actor presented with all relevant 
information may make worse judgements on average than an actor who only has available to him a subset 
of this information. A related but distinct phenomena is the curse of knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein and 
Weber 1989; Camerer 1995) in which better informed actors in asymmetric information models such as the 
earlier Cournot game are unable to accurately imagine being in the position of the less well-informed actors 
because the extra knowledge cannot simply be ignored. 
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employing heuristics since they face no computational constraints. Indeed with the costs 
(if any) to acquiling information known and unlimited conscious computational abilities, 
actors have no need for any type of tacit knowledge since they would gain nothing by 
restricting their conscious effort. Therefore mainstream economists neglect of tacit 
knowledge is at least understandable given the (admittedly unrealistic) assumptions of 
their models . 
A more sophisticated variant of rational choice model (Heiner 1983) 
acknowledges the possible utility to actors of adhering to simple rules, by portraying rule-
following as an actor's rational response to their own cognitive limitations. In effect these 
models simply increase the number of constraints faced by an actor to include search and 
processing costs, with the result that a (boundedly) rational actor may choose to adopt a 
heuristic. The problem with this approach remains the fact that all knowledge in these 
models is propositional and all functioning, intentionalistic. Yet if an actor is to be guided 
by a heuristic he must do so unthinkingly in each decision-situation, which requires an 
account of tacit functioning. So while it is appropriate to identify heuristics as being 
beneficial to an actor because they enable conscious effort to be automatically directed, 
these models must also recognise heuristics as functioning tacitly in order for them to 
pelform this function. 
The second theme I pursue in this section concerns the role of tacit knowledge in 
the functioning of propositional knowledge. Here I again refer to John Searle's work on 
intentionality to illustrate the argument. In section VI, I introduced the notion that many 
conscious mental states, including those here conceived of as propositional knowledge, 
J 
are intentional and that these states function causally in rational behaviour in accordance 
with the mechanism of intentional causation. According to this mechanism, an intentional 
state functions causally by virtue of being consciously scrutinised. Now I wish to make 
two points in relation to the idea of intentional causation. The first is to recognise that 
mainstream rational choice models deal with an idealised form of intentional causation 
(Runde 2002), since if we accept that these models portray an actor consciously choosing 
a preferred course of action given their wants and beliefs then that actor is behaving 
intentionalistically. My second point here is that these models eliminate the role that 
Searle attributes to the Background in the functioning of intentional states . 
As discussed earlier, Searle finds that rather than functioning III isolation, 
intentional states always function in conjunction with a Network of other intentional 
states and a Background of non-intentional capacities. In effect the Background, which 
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consists of non-conscious capacities, skills and know-how, provides the backdrop against 
which all intentionalistic functioning, including rational decision-making, takes place. In 
the case of my desire to purchase a quantity of shares in a particular company, a 
considerable amount of tacit knowledge concerning how to conduct share transactions is 
implicated in the functioning of my desire, just as is my propositional knowledge 
concerning the particular market on which that share is listed. By ignoring the role of tacit 
knowledge in the functioning of propositional knowledge, the mainstream approach takes 
our attention away from the importance in purposeful , intentionalistic, behaviour of the 
things that we typically have tacit knowledge of, such as the rules and structures that 
influence our social interactions (Lawson 1997), the complex technical skills that we 
draw on (Nelson and Winter 1982) or the habits we develop (Hodgson 1988). 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Prior to the information theoretic revolution, mainstream microeconomics paid scant 
attention to what actors could actually be presumed to know about their environment. The 
shift in emphasis brought about by the information revolution has led to explicit 
consideration of the effe«ts of imperfect and asymmetlic knowledge on the functioning of 
markets , as a result of which mainstream views regarding the properties of such markets 
have changed dramatically. 
Yet if the position I defend' in this paper is cOlTect, then despite having 
successfully focused the attention of mainstream economists on certain aspects of human 
knowledge, the nature of the mainstream project limits the extent to which issues 
concerning information, knowledge and ignorance can be adequately attended to within a 
mainstream framework. My argument here has proceeded by looking at three particular 
areas of economic agency that, while apparently central to the issue of information and 
knowledge, I believe to be neglected by the mainstream approach. First of all I drew 
attention to the expected utility model of decision-making, which I argued led to a 
conception of uncertainty in mainstream models that necessalily understates the role of 
novelty and surprise in economic behaviour. I then showed that the subjectivity that 
characterises much of what human beings know of their circumstances is excluded from 
these models by virtue of the pelfect correspondence between information and 
knowledge, which , barring 'black-spots', these models assume. Finally I argued that by 
93 
restricting all knowledge to be of an intentional form (beliefs and preferences), the role 
that tacit knowledge plays in behaviour is suppressed. In short then, while revolutionary 
in terms of the mainstream microeconomic project, the information theoretic revolution 
represents only a partial step towards the incorporation of the full complexities of human 
knowledge into economics. 
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